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INTRODUCTION
During the 1950s and 1960s, landmark rulings ordering school
desegregation, prison reform, and other structural changes transformed civil
litigation in the United States. The most striking feature of the new model of
litigation, Abram Chayes argued, was the metamorphosis of the judge into a
"creator and manager of complex forms of ongoing relief, which have
widespread effects on persons not before the court and require the judge's
continuing involvement in administration and implementation."' In structural
reform litigation cases, courts issue complex equitable remedies, and then
remain seized of the matter until the remedies are implemented, with judges
guiding and monitoring-at times in great detail-the creation or
transformation of state bureaucracies.
As constitutional courts and the practice of judicial review spread
throughout the world in the 1980s and 1990s, 2 structural reform litigation
began to appear, and even to flourish, outside the United States. Today high
courts in Colombia, Costa Rica, India, and South Africa respond to certain
social and economic rights-based claims with orders mandating significant
reform of how government provides particular services. 3 Scholars differ over
whether and under what circumstances such rulings are effective in altering the
distribution of material and symbolic goods in a society.4 But none dispute that
litigation." See David Sloss, Polymorphous Public Law Litigation: The Forgotten History of Nineteenth
Century Public Law Litigation (Santa Clara Univ. Legal Studies Research Paper No. 01-14, 2014),
http://ssm.com/abstract=2380681.
2. See TOM GINSBURG, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN NEW DEMOCRACIES: CONSTITUTIONAL
COURTS IN ASIAN CASES (2003); THE GLOBAL EXPANSION OF JUDICIAL POWER (C. Neal Tate &
Torbjom Vallinder eds., 1995); THE JUDICIALIZATION OF POLITICS IN ASIA (BjOt Dressel ed., 2012);
THE JUDICIALIZATION OF POLITICS IN LATIN AMERICA (Rachel Sieder, Line Schjolden & Alan Angell
eds., 2005); MARK TUSHNET, WEAK COURTS, STRONG RIGHTS: JUDICIAL REVIEW AND SOCIAL
WELFARE RIGHTS IN COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2008).
3. See generally COURTING SOCIAL JUSTICE: JUDICIAL ENFORCEMENT OF SOCIAL AND
ECONOMIC RIGHTS IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD (Varun Gauri & Daniel M. Brinks eds., 2008)
(exploring the outcomes of social and economic rights litigation in developing states); CESAR
RODRIGUEZ GARAVITO & DIANA RODRiGUEZ FRANCO, CORTES Y CAMBIO SOCIAL: COMO LA CORTE
CONSTITUCIONAL TRANSFORMO EL DESPLAZAMIENTO FORZADO EN COLOMBIA (2010) (examining the
role of structural reform litigation in Colombian forced displacement cases); SOCIAL RIGHTS
JURISPRUDENCE: EMERGING TRENDS IN INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW (Malcolm Langford
ed., 2008) (providing a comparative study of social rights litigation); Manoj Mate, Two Paths to Judicial
Power: The Basic Structure Doctrine and Public Interest Litigation in Comparative Perspective, 12
SAN DIEGO INT'L L.J. 175 (2010) (examining social rights and structural cases before the Indian
Supreme Court).
4. See Daniel M. Brinks & William Forbath, Social and Economic Rights in Latin America:
Constitutional Courts and the Prospects for Pro-Poor Interventions, 89 TEX. L. REV. 1943 (2011);
David Landau, The Reality of Social Rights Enforcement, 53 HARV. INT'L L.J. 189 (2012); Daniel M.
Brinks & Varun Gauri, The Law's Majestic Equality?: The Distributive Impact of Litigating Social and
Economic Rights (World Bank Dev. Research Grp. Working Paper 5999, 2012); see also Michael W.
McCann, Reform Litigation on Trial, 17 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 715 (1992) (emphasizing indirect and
symbolic impacts courts can have on social change); Gerald N. Rosenberg, Hollow Hopes and Other
Aspirations: A Reply to Feeley and McCann, 17 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 761 (1992) (debating how to
assess whether courts have an impact on social change).
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the spreading practice fundamentally alters the judicial role.5
The latest and perhaps most unexpected chapter in the evolution of
structural reform litigation is international. With the turn of the millennium, the
European Court of Human Rights and the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights began ordering reform of government policy and institutions, using
remedies for individual rights violations as a platform from which to
restructure state policies and institutions. In recent years, the Inter-American
Court of Human Rights has ordered states to reform conditions in prisons,
mental health centers, and juvenile detention centers; 6 to delimit indigenous
territories and grant indigenous communities collective land title based on
customary usage; 7 to create a mechanism for granting nationality to the
children of undocumented immigrants;8 and even to conduct "an educational
program for the general population" of Chihuahua, Mexico. 9 Over a quarter of
the Inter-American Court's judgments have required states to undertake
structural reforms.' 0 For its part, in 2004 the European Court began to declare
in certain cases that the situation leading to a violation is "systemic" and using
a mechanism called the "pilot procedure" to order extensive institutional
reform measures. Through twenty-nine pilot judgments, the European Court
has ordered Russia to relieve conditions of overcrowding in its prison system;
required Bulgaria, Germany, Greece, and Turkey to reduce delay in their
5. It alters the judicial role as formally conceived. As Chayes himself noted, the formal
description of adjudication was perhaps never empirically accurate. In practice, judges often engage in
long-term supervision of equitable decrees, for example, in bankruptcy and divorce proceedings.
Further, litigants can always return to court if their rights continue to be violated.
6. V6lez Loor v. PanamA, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Inter-Am.
Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 218, In 272, 278, 280 (Nov. 23, 2010) (migrants); Montero Aranguren (Detention
Center of Catia) v. Venezuela, Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Inter-Am. Ct.
H.R. (ser. C) No. 150, 143-44 (July 5, 2006) (prison); "Juvenile Reeducation Institute" v. Paraguay,
Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 112, 318,
320-21 (Sept. 2, 2004) (minors).
7. Xikmok Khsek Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, Merits, Reparations, and Costs,
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 214, 281-90 (Aug. 24, 2010); Saramaka People v. Suriname,
Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 172,
199 (Nov. 28, 2007); Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, Merits, Reparations, and
Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 146, 1 248(12) (Mar. 29, 2006); Indigenous Community Yakye
Axa v. Paraguay, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 125, 1 194-95 (June
17, 2005); Moiwana Community v. Suriname, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs,
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 124,1 209 (June 15, 2005); Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community
v. Nicaragua, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 79, 77 153, 164 (Aug. 31,
2001).
8. Girls Yean and Bosico v. Dominican Republic, Preliminary Objections, Merits,
Reparations, and Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 130, 239, 241 (Sept. 8, 2005).
9. Gonzlez ("Cotton Field") v. Mexico, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.
(ser. C) No. 205, 602.23 (Nov. 16, 2009) (ordering an education program as one measure, among
many others, towards ending femicides in Ciudad Jutirez, Mexico).
10. Data on the Inter-American Court's structural reform cases used in this Article is based on
the author's own reading, classification, and coding of the Inter-American Court's judgments and
compliance reports. To be classified as structural reform, cases have to meet three criteria: (1) the
remedial order requires equitable relief that requires change to a government policy or bureaucracy, (2)
the remedies affect parties not before the court, and (3) the court has been involved in supervising the
implementation of the remedy. For the European System, the author relies on the European Court's
classification of cases as pilot judgments, and draws on the Secretariat and Committee of Ministers
reports on these cases.
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judicial systems; and mandated that Albania, Poland, and Romania improve
mechanisms of compensation for communist-era takings." In these cases, both
courts remain seized of the matter until they deem the state has implemented
their orders successfully.
Mandating and then supervising structural reform at first seems a quixotic
undertaking for a supranational court. The problems that hound courts at the
national level-lack of knowledge about the institution targeted for reform,
lack of buy-in from the targeted parties, lack of enforcement mechanisms-are
only magnified at the international level. More deeply, by undertaking
structural reform adjudication, the human rights courts are stretching, if not re-
writing, their mandates. Reform litigation makes courts less court-like. When
courts rule against governments and order broad reforms based on individual
rights claims, they are at the ebb of their "triadic" legitimacy,12 acting in a
legislative and administrative rather than judicial role.
The appearance of structural reform litigation at the international level
thus poses two puzzles: why did the international human rights courts-with
weaker enforcement capacity and a narrower mandate than their counterparts-
come to engage in structural reform litigation, and how do they make it work?
Part I of the Article addresses the question of why. It argues that the courts
chose this path due to their encounter, starting in the 1990s, with new
democracies and other transitional states that were unable or unwilling to bring
their legal system into line with the courts' jurisprudence. Under the original
model of international human rights litigation, the human rights courts issued
remedies focused on making victims whole through monetary compensation.
However, this model soon faltered. In the face of repeat violations and ongoing
noncompliance, the courts chose to involve themselves more deeply at the
structural level, guiding and pressuring states to undertake ever more specific
reforms. Further, in both systems what began as a judicial creation has come to
be accepted as an important aspect of the courts' work. Part I closes with a
portrait of the contemporary structural reform practice of the human rights
courts: it provides information on the amount of cases each court has heard, the
subject matter of those cases, and levels of compliance.
Part II turns to the question of how the human rights courts undertake the
challenge. The Article's second argument is that each court has devised a
distinct set of judicial review strategies to contend with the practical problems
and legitimacy challenges of reforming the state from the distant seat of an
international court. Part II first sets the stage by discussing the types of judicial
review strategies that national courts adopt. It then explores whether
international courts are somehow different, concluding that while the human
rights courts are subject to the same pressures as national courts, their position
11. Pilot Judgments, EuR. COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS (Sept. 2014), http://www.echr.coe.int
/Documents/FSPilotjudgmentsENG.pdf. See also Eur. Parl. Ass., Ensuring the Viability of the
Strasbourg Court: Structural Deficiencies in States Parties, Doc. No. 13087 (2013) (counting twenty-
nine pilot procedure cases).
12. See MARTIN SF,."IRO, COURTS: A COMPARATIVE AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS 1-2 (1981)
(discussing triadic legitimacy a-. "the basic social logic of courts").
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without the state creates additional challenges in the realm of structural reform
litigation. Through examination of two property cases, one from each system,
the Article portrays and analyzes how each court contends with those
challenges. The Inter-American court has developed a review practice that
emphasizes the leadership of judges alongside active participation by vitcims
and the non-governmental organizations that represent them. By contrast, the
European supervisory dialogue emphasizes the role of third-party states
through the Committee of Ministers, in what this Article terms "multilateral
review." 13 These distinct strategies reflect the political and institutional context
of each court, and add to our understanding of how international courts
construct their authority through engagement with distinct audiences. Part III
closes the Article with a call for further comparative study of the effectiveness
and legitimacy of this new practice.
While scholars have examined the European pilot procedure cases, on the
one hand, and the advent of structural cases at the Inter-American Court, on the
other, no other study of which I am aware compares the two courts' turn to
structural reform. Viewing them together gives us insight into the choices and
challenges they each face, and provides a window into the question of how
international courts construct their power more generally. The study is thus in
conversation with the emerging scholarship on what Karen Alter calls "new-
style" international courts as a type of political actor with distinct political
agendas and effects. 14 By drawing from insights in the field of national judicial
politics to understand the growing international judiciary, the Article also
forms part of an emerging project to study national and international courts as a
single subject. 15 It contributes to the scholarship on comparative strategies of
judicial review a closer understanding of the review strategies international
courts forge in response to their unique political settings.
I. THE EVOLUTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS LITIGATION
The European and Inter-American human rights systems are Cold War
creations. They grew from the post-war project of building international law
and cooperation in order to safeguard against repetitions of mass-scale armed
conflict, 16 as well as to provide a safeguard against spreading communism.17
13. David Sloss suggested this term.
14. KAREN J. ALTER, THE NEW TERRAIN OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: COURTS, POLITICS,
RIGHTS (2013).
15. Jeffrey K. Staton & Will H. Moore, Judicial Power in Domestic and International
Politics, 65 INT'L ORG. 553 (2011) (arguing that the study of international and national courts should be
a single field).
16. Mikael Rask Madsen, From Cold War Instrument to Supreme European Court: The
European Court of Human Rights at the Crossroads of International and National Law and Politics, 32
LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 137, 139-40 (2007).
17. Id. at 140; see also KLAAS DYKMANN, HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY OF THE ORGANIZATIONS
OF AMERICAN STATES IN LATIN AMERICA: PHILANTHROPIC ENDEAVORS OR THE EXPLOITATION OF AN
IDEAL? 16 (2004) ("The Latin American countries agreed to create the OAS as an 'anti-Communist
instrument' because the US accepted the nonintervention principle and the Southern States were eager
for the US promise to provide economic assistance.") (citations omitted).
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Thus, the Council of Europe Human Rights System, which came into being in
1959 and to which the European Court of Human Rights belongs, was
conceived originally as a type of "early warning system to sound the alarm in
case Europe's fledgling democracies began to backslide toward
totalitarianism.' 18 Working within a system of like-minded liberal democracies,
it was an acknowledgment of the lesson of World War II that even democratic
republics could devolve into tyranny and needed external checks. The Inter-
American Court opened its doors almost two decades later. While modeled
after the European Court of Human Rights, it quickly began to reshape its
remedial regime in response to its distinct political context.
A. The Classic Declaratory Model
Three features distinguish the original declaratory model of human rights
litigation, as embodied in the European Court of Human Rights' early practice:
the scope of the judgment's declaration of a rights violation on the merits, the
scope of the remedies, and the manner of supervision and enforcement. First,
the Court's judgment refers and applies exclusively to the facts and the litigants
before the Court. The Court was conceived of not as reviewing the content of a
law as such, but rather its application in a particular case. As Chayes phrased it,
"[t]he controversy is about an identified set of completed events." 19 Thus, even
if a particular violation was the fruit of a particular government policy or law, it
was the state action rather than the policy that violated the underlying human
rights convention. It is true that the state had a duty to comply with the
underlying convention. If a judgment indicated that the application of a law in a
particular case had violated the convention, the state was on notice that it
should consider revising the offending law. But that was not, strictly speaking,
the concern of the judgment. The Court's ruling served to indicate the meaning
of the rights guaranteed by the European Convention of Human Rights, and
states had discretion over how to bring themselves into compliance.
Second, the remedy, as originally conceived, was aimed only at making
the victim whole. The European Convention makes but brief mention of the
Courts' reparatory powers late in the text, providing that "[i]f the Court finds
that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if
the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial
reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to
the injured party."20 While the term "just satisfaction" would seem to include
equitable relief as well as monetary compensation, the European Court ordered
only monetary compensation in its early years.21
18. Laurence R. Heifer, Redesigning the European Court of Human Rights: Embeddedness as
a Deep Structural Principle of the European Human Rights Regime, 19 EUR. J. INT'L L. 125, 129
(2008).
19. Chayes, supra note 1, at 1282.
20. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art.
41, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 [hereinafter European Convention].
21. Helfer, supra note 18, at 136; Tom Barkhuysen & Michiel L. van Emmerik, A
Comparative View on the Execution of Judgments of the European Court of Human Rights, in
(Vol. 40: 1
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Third, the European Convention assigns supervision of the European
Court's sentences to the Committee of Ministers, the Council of Europe's main
decision-making body, composed of foreign ministers.22 Thus, it is a political
body, rather than the Court itself, that concerns itself with implementation of its
judgments.
Under this classic model, the Court has a twofold role. First, it declares to
the state, and the world, that a particular action by the state violates a human
rights standard protected by the Convention. It is then the state and the
Committee of Ministers-not the Court-that work towards ensuring the state
does not repeat the violation. Second, the Court concerns itself with the
individual victims, ordering the state to make them whole. This twofold role is
reflected in the structure of the judgments. The merits section declares that the
state has violated a right, enunciating the right in question and applying it to the
facts of the case. The remedial or operative section focuses on making the
victim whole, most often by assigning monetary compensation. The declaratory
model expresses the idea that even as democratic governments need an external
check, they must retain their core role of deciding on particular policies and
laws, as a matter of sovereignty and democracy.
The early trajectory of the European Court suggests that the declaratory
model worked among a small group of states similarly committed to
democratic governance. Although the European Convention on Human Rights
was written in the shadow of the atrocities of World War II, Western Europe in
the post-war era was a lawful and mostly democratic region.23 The Court began
its work with jurisdiction over eight states, all Western European, rule-of-law
democracies. Its early years were quiescent.25 The Court acted as a fine-tuner,
"setting up subtle tests of proportionality to examine restrictions aimed at
EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS: REMEDIES AND EXEcUTION OF JUDGMENTS 1, 4-5 (Theodora
Christou & Juan Pablo Raymond eds., 2005).
22. European Convention, supra note 20, art. 46.
23. Wojciech Sadurski, Partnering with Strasbourg: Constitutionalisation of the European
Court of Human Rights, the Accession of Central and East European States to the Council of Europe,
and the Idea of Pilot Judgments, 9 HUM. RTS. L. REv. 397, 406 (2009).
24. The Convention entered into force on September 3, 1953, with the ratifications of
Denmark, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. See
Mikael Rask Madsen, The Protracted Institutionalization of the Strasbourg Court: From Legal
Diplomacy to integrationist Jurisprudence, in THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS BETWEEN
LAW AND POLITICS 46 (Jonas Christoffersen & Mikael Rask Madsen eds., 2011). The Court came into
being in 1959 with jurisdiction over Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Federal Republic of Germany, Iceland,
Ireland, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands. See id. For the text of the Convention, see The Convention in
1950, COUNCIL OF EUR., http://human-rights-convention.org/the-texts/the-convention-in-1950 (last
visited Dec. 4,2014).
25. But this oft-told narrative of law-abiding states seems incomplete. Ireland was a founding
member of the Court, and Turkey ratified the Convention in 1954. Ratification of International Human
Rights Treaties - Turkey, UNIv. MINN. HUMAN RIGHTS LIBRARY, http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts
/research/ratification-turkey.html (last visited Dec. 4, 2014). Cases of state-sponsored atrocity began
appearing before the Council of Europe system in its earliest days. See Ba~ak Call, The Logics of
Supranational Human Rights Litigation, Official Acknowledgement, and Human Rights Reform: The
Southeast Turkey Cases Before the European Court of Human Rights, 1996-2006, 35 LAW & Soc.
INQUIRY 311, 312-13 (2010). Mikael Rask Madsen argues that the Court deftly handled questions
having to do with the colonial--and thus non-democratic-practices and pasts of some of the European
states. See Madsen, supra note 24, at 43.
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legitimate ends, establishing the tests of, for example, access to personal
information contained in medical files, the scope of the duties of authorities to
consult trade unions . . . or the status of 'illegitimate children. ' '26 In each of
these cases, the Court would declare that there had been a violation, and, at
times, issue an order for monetary compensation of the victims. The case
would then leave the Court's hands. As noted above, the Committee of
Ministers, a political body in which ministers of each state sit in representation
of their state, is charged with supervising compliance with the European
Court's rulings.27 Once states paid compensation and adjusted their systems to
the Convention, the Committee would declare them to be in compliance with
the Court's ruling. The Committee used a deferential standard of review of
compliance, viewing states as primarily responsible for deciding how to reform
their legal and political systems.
1. The Limits of the Declaratory Model in the Americas
The Inter-American Court was given a broader remedial mandate than its
European counterpart. While the European Convention allows the Court to
"afford just satisfaction to the injured party," the American Convention on
Human Rights provides that having found a violation,
the Court shall rule that the injured party be ensured the enjoyment of his
right or freedom that was violated. It shall also rule, if appropriate, that the
consequences of the measure or situation that constituted the breach of
such right or freedom be remedied and that fair compensation be paid to
the injured party.28
The American Convention thus explicitly assigns the Inter-American
Court remedial powers beyond mere compensation. But, strictly construed, the
focus is on repairing the harm done to the victim in the case before the Court.
The Court must attend to the consequences of the measure or situation to be
remedied. The Convention does not explicitly grant the Court power to
examine or alter the measure or situation itself so as to prevent future
violations. Another difference is that the American Convention does not assign
supervision to any actor in particular, but provides that the Court shall specify
to the Organization of American States (OAS) General Assembly "the cases in
which a state has not complied with its judgments, making any pertinent
recommendations., 29 The provision implies that the Court must keep abreast of
state compliance, but seems to place the power to respond to noncompliance in
the hands of the General Assembly.
In its first cases, the Inter-American Court limited itself to ordering
26. Sadurski, supra note 23, at 407 (footnote omitted).
27. European Convention, supra note 20, art. 46.
28. European Convention, supra note 20, art. 41; Organization of American States, American
Convention on Human Rights art. 63(1), Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123
[hereinafter American Convention].
29. Id. art. 65.
[Vol. 40: 1
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monetary compensation and did not supervise compliance with its judgments.30
This declaratory model of human rights litigation, however, soon revealed its
limits. In contrast to the European Court, the Inter-American Court began life
in 1979 overseeing a region in which military dictatorships and civil war
predominated. 31 Even as the Latin American states supported the creation of a
human rights court, many were engaged in campaigns of forced disaPpearance,
extrajudicial killing, and torture targeted against internal dissidents. 2 In such
cases, the Court would declare a violation and issue a monetary remedy, much
like its European counterpart. It would also, in its reasoning, suggest actions
the state should undertake to come into compliance with the Convention. For
example, in its first case, which involved forced disappearances in Honduras,
the Court suggested that the state must investigate and punish the crime.33
However, this was not included in the remedial section of the judgment.
Honduras was deemed to have complied with the ruling once it paid
compensation to the relatives of the victims, even if the state continued to deny
and cover up state-sponsored forced disappearances.3 4 Under the declaratory
model, in other words, the Inter-American Court was not able to protect
individuals from ongoing state violations pursuant to a policy. It could only
force states to pay for the damage to certain individuals whose petitions made it
through the Inter-American System.
35
The Inter-American Court soon began to depart from the traditional
model of compensatory remedies. In 1996, it issued several reparatory rulings
addressing state-sponsored violence. In each, the Inter-American Court ordered
the state to pay monetary compensation, as it had in earlier cases. But it also
began requiring the state to undertake certain acts. For example, it ordered
states to investigate the underlying acts and, where there was criminal
30. Thomas Antkowiak, Remedial Approaches to Human Rights Violations: The Inter-
American Court of Human Rights and Beyond, 46 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 351, 365-66 (2008).
31. When the Court first convened in June of 1979, the following states were under its
jurisdiction: Bolivia, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Grenada,
Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Panama, Peru, and Venezuela. B-32: American Convention on
Human Rights, INTER-AMERICAN COMM'N ON HUMAN RIGHTS, http://www.cidh.org/Basicos/English
/Basic4.Amer.Conv.Ratif.htrn (last visited Dec. 4, 2014).
32. See, e.g., STATE VIOLENCE AND GENOCIDE IN LATIN AMERICA: THE COLD WAR YEARS
(Marcia Esparza et al. eds., 2010); see also SOCIETIES OF FEAR: THE LEGACY OF CIVIL WAR, VIOLENCE
AND TERROR IN LATIN AMERICA (Kees Koonings & Dirk Kruijt eds., 1999) (examining the legacy of
state violence in the region). Again, it is important to recall that Spain, Portugal, and Greece also were
governed by dictatorships that violated the most fundamental rights. That these cases did not find their
way to the European Court speaks also to the question of how states and the European Commission
chose their cases before the era of the individual petition. Overall, however, the differences between
governments in the two regions are stark, and this likely played a role in shaping the courts' dockets.
33. Veldsquez Rodriguez v. Honduras, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.
(ser. C) No. 7, 1 34 (July 21, 1989); Claudio Grossman, The Velisquez Rodriguez Case: The
Development of the Inter-American Human Rights System, in INTERNATIONAL LAW STORIES 77, 87
(John E. Noyes et al. eds., 2007).
34. Veldsquez Rodriguez v. Honduras, Interpretation of the Judgment of Reparations and
Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 9, 44 (Aug. 17, 1990).
35. But, as one mother declared, "My son was not a cow, I don't want money, what I want is
justice." Viviana Krsticevic, Comment, Reparations in the Inter-American System: A Comparative
Approach, 56 AM. U. L. REv. 1375, 1419 (2007) (quoting a mother of one of the victims in the case of
El Amparo v. Venezuela).
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responsibility, to punish.36 In other words, rather than letting the state choose
the manner of righting the wrong, the Court demanded specific equitable
relief.37 Note that the remedial order is still focused on retrospectively repairing
the harm. In order to comply with such an order, however, states had to
undertake structural change, such as derogating amnesties and grappling with
the complex power structure underlying impunity. The Court also began to
order equitable remedies aimed at restorative justice for the victim. Today, the
Inter-American Court is "the only international human rights body with binding
powers that has consistently ordered equitable remedies.,
38
Starting in 2000, the Inter-American Court took its remedial innovation a
step further. It began to order not just remedies aimed at making victims whole,
but also guarantees of non-repetition aimed at changing the structure of the
state, so that the situation that led to the violation would not recur, even against
different victims. By the 1990s, most Latin American states were no longer
actively engaged in violent political repression. However, the states had large
democratic deficits, and, in particular, the states had levels of inequality that
ultimately posed a challenge to democracy. 39 Victor Abramovic argues that this
led to changes in the kinds of cases that reach the Inter-American System, and
the Court in particular. The Court, in turn, began "to set standards and
principles to guide the actions of democratic States ... through the formulation
of public policies." 40 In 2000, the Inter-American Court issued the first four
rulings that can be classified as structural-they explicitly demand that the state
reform or create a bureaucracy or policy. And then it began to supervise their
implementation.4' Since then, such orders have become common. Today, in
over fifty contentious cases, the Court has issued what this Article defines as
structural orders.4 2
Parallel to its adoption of innovative remedies, the Inter-American Court
began to supervise compliance to its rulings through compliance reports.43
36. See, e.g., El Amparo v. Venezuela, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.
(ser. C) No. 28, 64 (Sept. 14, 1996).
37. Alexandra Huneeus, International Criminal Law by Other Means: The Quasi-Criminal
Jurisdiction of the Human Rights Courts, 107 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 8 (2013).
38. Antkowiak, supra note 30, at 355.
39. As noted above, the first steps in remedial innovation have their roots not in structural
problems but in prosecution. First, more states were less likely to comply, creating serious problems of
legitimacy. Second, the Court was more alone in the enterprise of pushing toward compliance-there
was no equivalent to the Committee of Ministers, a political body in the Council of Europe System
charged with pushing states toward general compliance and compliance with specific court judgments.
Third, in light of the kinds of human rights violations before the Inter-American System, monetary
compensation was a particularly weak response.
40. Victor Abramovic, From Massive Violations to Structural Patterns: New Approaches and
Classic Tensions in the Inter-American Human Rights System, 11 SUR INT'L J. HUM. RTs. 7, 17 (2009).
41. Barrios Altos v. Peru, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No.
87, 50 (Nov. 30, 2001); Villagrin Morales v. Guatemala, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am.
Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 77, 123 (May 26, 2001); Paniagua Morales v. Guatemala, Reparations and Costs,
Judgement, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 76, 229 (May 25, 2001).
42. See supra note 10.
43. Article 65 of the American Convention says only that the Court can refer a case of
noncompliance to the OAS General Assembly. American Convention, supra note 28, art. 65. The Court
quickly learned, however, that this option was not effective; the General Assembly consistently failed to
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Thus the Court came to be involved not just in adjudication, but also the task of
monitoring implementation of its orders, miring it in years of ongoing
involvement with each case. The American Convention does not explicitly give
the Court the power to supervise its rulings, and Panama challenged the Court
in one of its early attempts." However, the Court issued a judgment affirming
its power to monitor compliance as "inherent in its jurisdictional function. 45
Since then, states have accepted the practice, submitting compliance reports
and appearing in compliance hearings at the Court's request. The Inter-
American Court's shift away from the declaratory model was complete.
2. Docket Crisis in Europe
With the close of the Cold War, the European Court also came to feel the
limits of the declaratory model. The Council of Europe System, originally set
up as a bulwark against communism, 46 grew to include the post-Communist
states. This expansion was a dramatic change. Not only did the Court's
jurisdiction grow from twenty-three to over forty states in the course of a few
years, but it came to include states that were struggling to govern through
democracy after years of authoritarianism, and that had economic
circumstances very different from those of the founding states. By the 2000s,
the Court's docket was deluged with cases, threatening the Council of Europe
System's viability.47 Many of the cases, moreover, were "repetitive cases"--
cases that shared similar underlying facts, and revealed the same state actor
violating the same provision of the Convention over and over again.48 The rise
in the number of repetitive cases showed that states-especially the new
states-were not changing their practices in light of Court rulings. Instead,
while states complied with the monetary relief demanded in the operative
section of the judgment, they failed to fix the underlying state law or practice
that created the violation in the first place. Those harmed by state action turned
to the Court for relief. But the Court began to sink under the weight of so many
claims.
The Council of Europe began to view the docket crisis as a threat to the
System: the Court would not be able to work effectively with such a heavy
caseload.49 The solution, originally suggested by the Committee of Ministers,
respond with sufficient force. Since 1996, the Court has interpreted the Convention to allow it to
monitor its own rulings. See Baena-Ricardo v. Panama, Competence, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No.
104, IM 100-04 (Nov. 28, 2003) (rejecting Panama's challenge to its power to supervise compliance);
INTER-AM. CT. H.R., RuLEs OF PROCEDURE, art. 63 (2009), http://www.corteidh.or.er/sitios/reglamento
/ene_2009 ing.pdf.
44. See Baena-Ricardo, No. 104; INTER-AM. CT. H.R., RULES OF PROCEDURE, supra note 43,
art. 69 (specifying procedures for supervision).
45. Baena Ricardo, No. 104, 131.
46. Madsen, supra note 16, at 140.
47. See 6th Annual Report of the Committee of Ministers, COUNCIL OF EUR. 41 (2012),
http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/execution/Source/Publications/CM annreport2012-en.pdf. The
Court had over 11,000 cases pending in 2012. Id.
48. Pilot Judgments, supra note 11, at 1.
49. Council of Eur. Comm. of Ministers, Resolution on Judgments Revealing an Underlying
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was to join repetitive cases and directly order the state to fix the underlying
problem. In 2004, the Court created the pilot judgment procedure to address
structural "dysfunction affecting the protection of the Convention right in
question in the national legal order., 50 Under this process, the Court selects a
few repetitive cases and seeks "to achieve a solution that extends beyond the
particular case or cases so as to cover all similar cases raising the same
issue., 51 The Court (a) chooses one case, (b) freezes like cases, (c) issues
complex remedial orders demanding that the state restructure the institutions
creating the repeat cases, and (d) takes on a greater role monitoring
compliance. "The pilot judgment is therefore intended to help the national
authorities to eliminate the systemic or structural problem highlighted by the
Court as giving rise to repetitive cases." 52 Eventually the Committee of
Ministers approved the pilot procedure, and it is now written into the Court's
rules.5 3 By October 2012, the European Court had declared thirteen pilot cases.
By September 2014, the Court's official tally put the number at twenty-one.
5 4
It should be noted that the European Court's engagement with structural
reform stretches beyond the pilot procedure. The Court has also increasingly
issued so-called quasi-pilot judgments, or Article 46 judgments. 55 In these
cases, as in pilot judgments, the Court declares that the rights violation in
question is caused by a systemic problem and that the state must take measures
to resolve the underlying systemic problem, and it may even suggest which
measures the state should take. However, in contrast to pilot judgment cases,
the Court does not transform those suggestions into binding orders by putting
them in the operative section of the judgment,56 and the Court does not adjourn
similar cases. Finally, the Committee of Ministers has developed its own
system for prioritizing the supervision of cases that it views as implicating a
need for systemic reform.57 While these developments also move the Council
of Europe toward a system more focused on reforming state structures, this
Article focuses only on the pilot procedure cases as a pure case of structural
reform practice.
58
Systemic Problem, 114th Sess. Res. 3 (May 12, 2004).
50. Hutten-Czapska v. Poland, App. No. 35014/97, 2006-VIII Eur. Ct. H.R. 234 (June 19,
2006).
51. The Pilot-Judgment Procedure, COUNCIL OF EUR. (2009), http://www.echr.coe.int
/Documents/Pilotjudgment procedure ENG.pdf.
52. Id. 14.
53. EuR. COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, RULES OF COURT r. 61 (2013), http://www.echr.coe.int
/Documents/Rules CourtENG.pdf.
54. Pilot Judgments, supra note 11.
55. European Convention, supra note 20, art. 46.
56. Examples of quasi-pilot judgments include Lukenda v. Slovenia, App. No. 23032/02,
2005 Eur. Ct. H.R (Oct. 6, 2005); Sejdovic v. Italy, App. No. 56581/00, 2005 Eur. Ct. H.R. (Nov. 10,
2005); and Xenides Arestis v. Turkey, App. No. 46347/99, 2005 Eur. Ct. H.R. (Dec. 22, 2005). See
PHILIP LEACH ET AL., RESPONDING TO SYSTEMIC HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS: AN ANALYSIS OF
'PILOT JUDGMENTS' OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND THEIR IMPACT AT NATIONAL
LEVEL 24-26 (2010).
57. See 6th Annual Report of the Committee of Ministers, supra note 47, at 25-26.
58. See supra note 10.
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For both courts, then, the declaratory model of human rights litigation
became untenable. And for both courts, the solution was a new form of
engagement with states. While there are important differences between the
courts' practice of structural litigation, they share certain basic features,
constituting a new model of regional rights litigation.
B. The Structural Reform Model
In a famous 1976 article, Abram Chayes analyzed the emergence of
structural reform litigation in the United States. Traditionally, he noted, we
conceive of litigation as retrospective: "[t]he controversy is about an identified
set of completed events." 59 Further, the controversy is conceived of as between
two parties: the remedy is tailored to fit the harm caused by the defendant to
the plaintiff and "[t]he impact of the judgment is confined to the parties." 60
Litigation before the international human rights courts never entirely
resembled Chayes' traditional model of private civil litigation. After all, the
defendant is a nation-state, and not a private party. The issues that were to
come before the human rights courts were always imagined as having a public
dimension. The declaratory model of human rights litigation nonetheless was
based on and shared many features of the traditional civil litigation model.
Chayes argues that the rise of structural reform litigation in the United
States fundamentally altered these classic features. The harm was now
conceived of as ongoing; and the remedy was no longer designed to address a
discrete harm suffered by the plaintiff, but came to encompass "complex forms
of ongoing relief, which have widespread effects on persons not before the
Court and require the judge's continuing involvement in administration and
implementation. ' 61 Further, he observed that in the new litigation, "[tlhe
traditional adversary relationship is suffused and intermixed with negotiating
and mediating processes at every point.,
62
Similarly, there are three features that define the new structural turn in
human rights structural litigation. Each was a feature first highlighted by
Chayes in his seminal article. The first feature refers to the complaint itself:
the petition to the Court is of such a nature that, even if formally filed as an
individual claim, it has implications beyond the individual litigant. In other
words, the plaintiff is not claiming that there was a mistake or abuse in a
particular interaction with the state, but rather cites "a grievance about the
operation of public policy."63 In order to remedy the violation, or else to keep it
from recurring, the state would have to change its method of provision of a
particular service. This feature is what first takes the case beyond what Chayes
described as the traditional conception of adjudication, which viewed the
59. Chayes, supra note 1, at 1282 (emphasis added).
60. Id. at 1282-83.
61. Id. at 1284.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 1302.
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litigation as bipolar--dealing with only two parties. 64 The scope of the matter
inherently affects and involves non-parties.
The second feature refers to the nature of the remedies issued by the
Court. In the words of Chayes, relief is "forward looking, fashioned ad hoc on
flexible and broadly remedial lines, often having important consequences for
many persons including absentees." 65 Usually, courts avoid injunctive relief: it
is simpler and quicker, and by now more routine, to order the executive to write
a check than it is to order diverse state actors to undertake particular actions. In
structural cases, however, courts draw on their equitable powers and embroil
themselves in the messy business of injunctive relief. Further, the order seeks
not just to make the plaintiff whole, but to alter how the government provides a
particular service. Through the remedial order, the judge makes policy that
affects broad groups of citizens, and begins to encroach on the legislative and
administrative roles.
66
The third feature refers to what happens after the Court issues the
remedies. In traditional litigation, the Court's involvement in a case ends with
the final judgment. In structural reform cases, the judgment only signals the
end of the adjudication phase and the beginning of the monitoring phase: the
Court becomes involved in the long-term supervision, guidance, and
assessment of the implementation of the order. This third point is crucial and
67
often overlooked. Not only does the judge order the implementation of a
particular policy, she becomes involved in its execution. If through the second
remedial feature the Court begins to invade the legislative role, this supervisory
feature takes the judge into the executive's turf. it involves courts in the work
of administrators charged with executing policy.
64. Id. at 1282.
65. Id. at 1302.
66. For example, litigation in which the Brazilian courts order the state to provide HIV
medication to a single litigant, therefore, would not qualify as public law litigation under this definition.
Hoffmann and Bentes make the distinction between individual and collective claims. Florian F.
Hoffmann & Fernando R.N.M. Bentes, Accountability for Social and Economic Rights in Brazil, in
COURTING SOCIAL JUSTICE, supra note 3, at 100, 101. Landau also makes this distinction, calling the
two principles "individualized enforcement" and "large-scale judicial populism." Landau, supra note 4,
at 199, 216. Here, I include only cases that directly order reform. Compensating the individual before
the court falls into the more traditional notion of public law. Note, though, that if enough rulings come
down ordering the government to compensate an individual in a particular manner, the institution might
undertake reform of its practice to avoid litigation. This method is less available to the international
courts, however, because of the peculiarity and size of their dockets. The pilot procedure retains aspects
of this form, however, because it pursues one case to resolve a structural problem, and then returns to
other repetitive cases to keep resolving it should the first fail. Pilot Judgments, supra note 11, at 1.
67. Cdsar Rodriguez-Garavito, Beyond the Courtroom: The Impact of Judicial Activism on
Socioeconomic Rights in Latin America, 89 TEx. L. REV. 1669, 1674 (2011).
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Table 1: Two Models of International Rights Adjudication
Facts and parties Structural situation
before court
Restitutio ad integrum Reform of structuraldysfunction
Political supervision Judicial supervision
There are significant differences between the courts' two forms of
approaching structural reform cases. Once the European Court declares that it
will use the pilot procedure, several things follow that have no analog in the
Inter-American System. Especially striking is that other like cases are frozen,
68left in abeyance, until the case chosen as the test case is resolved. Further, in
pilot cases, the European Committee of Ministers remains deeply involved in
supervision, 69 whereas the Inter-American Court single-handedly supervises all
of its cases.
70
But the main contours of their evolution in this direction are shared, and
reminiscent of the move first noted by Chayes from private civil litigation to
public law litigation. Faced with the challenge of structural violations, the
courts chose to become more deeply involved in policymaking at the state
level.
1. International Structural Reform Litigation Today
The Inter-American Court has issued structural remedial orders and
supervised their implementation in a quarter of its roughly 170 contentious
judgments. 71 These are cases in which the Court demands in the remedial
section of its judgment that the state create or reform the manner in which it
68. The Inter-American Court does not yet link similar cases against a state in this way.
However, it does sometimes use a single compliance hearing to discuss several similar cases against a
state, and it has plans to further link the supervision process of similar structural cases. Roberto Caldas,
Vice-President, Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Conference Presentation at La Implementaci6n
de las Decisiones del Sistema Interamericano y la Administraci6n de Justicia: El Proceso de Supervision
de Decisiones: La Perspectiva de la Corte Interamericana (Nov. 24, 2014).
69. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
70. That means that judicial officers follow up with the state, the Inter-American
Commission, and the parties, pushing them to report back on the state of implementation. When there is
a delay, the Court calls the three parties to a closed hearing, where they sit to work towards an
agreement towards implementation. Then the Court returns to requesting information from the parties
about compliance. This process continues, sometimes for years, until the Court declares that there has
been full compliance with each of its orders. (Note that in structural cases, some argue that the
rapporteurships of the Commission also act as a kind of compliance officer.) See Victor Abramovich,
De las Violaciones Masivas a los Patrones Estructurales: Nuevos Enfoques y Clisicas Tensiones en el
Sistema Interamericano de Derechos Humanos, 63 DERECHO PUCP 95, 129-30 (2009).
71. This statement is based on original coding and analysis of the Court's judgments and
compliance reports. See supra note 10.
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provides or protects a particular right in general, or for a particular group. 72
While the cases span many different areas of rights protection, the Court has
focused its efforts on certain areas of state practice. For example, the structural
reform cases reflect the Court's traditional emphasis on protection against
illegal state repression and state-sponsored violence: one line of cases orders
states to limit military jurisdiction and to remove other roadblocks to
prosecution of gross violations that involve state actors. 73 Another line of cases
develops the right to collective property based on traditional usage.74 In these
cases, the remedial order typically demands that the state delimit the
community's land and grant collective legal title, in consultation with the
benefited group and others whose rights may be affected. A third line focuses
on detention practices: the Court has issued remedial rulings that aim to alter
conditions of detention of prisoners, immigrants, juveniles, and mental health
patients. 75 The Court also typically orders states to create courses on human
rights for state workers, at times even specifying the material that the course
should include.76
The European Court of Human Rights has opened the pilot procedure in
over thirty distinct situations, but the majority of these have focused on two
main areas. The first is judicial process and judicial reform, particularly to
address non-enforcement of judicial decisions in former Soviet-bloc states, 77
and judicial delay.78 The Court has also issued pilot judgments in a line of
cases dealing with compensation and individual property rights in the wake of
72. Thus, the number excludes cases in which the Court makes suggestions in the merits
section of the judgment, but does not turn the recommendation into a legal obligation through its
inclusion in the operative section. The number also excludes cases in which the Court had not yet
supervised the implementation of its structural remedial orders by December 2012, and it excludes cases
in which an equitable remedial order aims only to make an individual plaintiff whole.
73. See, e.g., Radilla-Pacheco v. Mexico, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and
Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 209, 9 346 (Nov. 23, 2009); Tiu Tojin v. Guatemala, Merits,
Reparations, and Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 190, %9 118-20 (Nov. 26, 2008); Palamara-
Iribame v. Chile, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 135, 1 14 (Nov. 22,
2005); Mapiripin Massacre v. Colombia, Merits, Reparations & Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No.
134, 124, 132 (Sept. 15, 2005); Castillo Petruzzi v. Peru, Merits, Reparations & Costs, Inter-Am. Ct.
H.R. (ser. C) No. 52, 128 (May 30, 1999). This line of cases is discussed in Juan Carlos Gutirrrez &
Silvano Cantfi, The Restriction of Military Jurisdiction in International Human Rights Protection
Systems, 7 SUR INT'L J. HUM. RTS. 75 (2010).
74. See cases cited supra note 7.
75. See cases cited supra note 6.
76. See, e.g., Gonzlez et al. ("Cotton Field") v. Mexico, Preliminary Objection, Merits,
Reparations, and Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 205, 602.22-23 (Nov. 16, 2009) (ordering
"permanent education and training programs and courses for public officials on human rights and
gender, and on a gender perspective").
77. Ivanov v. Ukraine, App. No. 40450/04, 2009 Eur. Ct. H.R. (Oct. 15, 2009); Olaru v.
Moldova, App. Nos. 476/07, 22539/05, 17911/08, 13136/07, 2009 Eur. Ct. H.R. (July 28, 2009);
Burdov v. Russia, App. No. 33509/04, 2009 Eur. Ct. H.R. (Jan. 15, 2009).
78. Glykantzi v. Greece, App. No. 40150/09, 2012 Eur. Ct. H.R. (Oct. 30, 2012);
Michelioudakis v. Greece, App. No. 54447/10, 2012 Eur. Ct. H.R. (Apr. 3, 2012); Ummflhan Kaplan v.
Turkey, App. No. 24240/07, 2012 Eur. Ct. H.R. (Mar. 20, 2012); Dimitrov v. Bulgaria, App. Nos.
48059/06, 2708/09, 2011 Eur. Ct. H.R. (May 10, 2011); Finger v. Bulgaria, App. No. 37346/05, 2011
Eur. Ct. H.R. (May 10, 2011); Rumpf v. Germany, App. No. 46344/06, 2010 Eur. Ct. H.R. (Sept. 2,
2010).
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political transitions, and particularly in the transition from communism. 79 Other
pilot judgments have addressed problems of detention practices, 80 loss of
citizenship, 81 and the right to vote.82 The majority of the pilot judgments have
been issued in the past five years, indicating that the Court is relying more on
this tool. Further, although the debate that led to the creation of the pilot
procedure stressed the problem of repetitive cases from Eastern Europe, the list
of pilot procedures includes judgments against Germany, Italy, and the United
Kingdom, as well as long-time members like Turkey and Greece.
2. Constitutional Power Grab?
The world's two main regional rights courts, then, have begun
undertaking structural reform, a practice that even national courts engage in
only sparingly and at considerable risk to their legitimacy. The narratives of
each court's evolution toward structural intervention differ. One emphasizes
the challenges of democratization, the other docket control.83 But their shared
elements can be used to construct an alternative narrative of creeping
constitutionalization. Both stories claim that the new post-authoritarian
democracies of the post-Cold War period-the democracies born or reborn in
the wake of socialism in Europe and in the wake of military dictatorships
and/or civil war in the Americas-have weakly institutionalized judiciaries,
and are thus incapable of independently making the structural changes
necessary to comply with their respective human rights obligations.8 4 Further,
both claim that what follows from this observation-the solution to the
problem-is that international courts need to step in to help states make those
structural changes.
This solution, however, is not inevitable. Indeed, what the courts issue as
a seeming critique of the new states-that they are too weakly institutionalized
to implement complex remedial orders-can be cast instead as a criticism of
courts and of trying to solve structural policy questions through case-by-case
79. Alisic v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, App. No. 60642/08, 2012 Eur. Ct. H.R. (Nov. 6, 2012);
Maria Atanasiu v. Romania, App. Nos. 30767/05, 33800/06, 2010 Eur. Ct. H.R. (Oct. 12, 2010);
Suljagik v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, App. No. 27912/02, 2009 Eur. Ct. H.R. (Nov. 3, 2009); Hutten-
Czapska v. Poland, App. No. 35014/97, 2006-VIII Eur. Ct. H.R. (June 19, 2006); Broniowski v. Poland,
App. No. 31443/96, 2004-V Eur. Ct. H.R. (June 22, 2004).
80. Torreggianai v. Italy, App. No. 43517/09, 2013 Eur. Ct. H.R. (Jan. 8, 2013); Ananyev v.
Russia, App. Nos. 42525/07, 60800/08, 2012 Eur. Ct. H.R. (Jan. 10, 2012).
81. Kuric and Others v. Slovenia, App. No. 26828/06, 2012 Eur. Ct. H.R. (June 26, 2012).
82. Greens and M.T. v. The United Kingdom, App. Nos. 60041/08, 60054/08, 2010 Eur. Ct.
H.R. (Nov. 23, 2010).
83. As Sadurski argues, the sense of docket crisis provided cover for a deep transformation:
"The central reason provided by the Court to support its use of a pilot-judgment approach is that of
docket control: an admittedly much more pedestrian rationale than a grandiose constitutional
transformation of the Court itself." Sadurski, supra note 23, at 422.
84. On the Inter-American Court, see Abramovic, supra note 40, at 16, which argues that
"states, with their legitimately elected officials, are not capable of reversing and impeding arbitrary
practices committed by their own agents, nor of ensuring effective mechanisms of accountability, on
account of the precarious functioning of their judicial systems." On the European Court, see, for
example, Sadurski, supra note 23, at 406-07.
2015]
THE YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
adjudication.85 The courts could have resigned themselves to a more declaratory
role in these types of structural matters. Courts might have concluded that they
work best to reform well-functioning democracies at the margins, or else as
alarm systems for gross violations. Deep structural problems should be
resolved by the political bodies. The risk of this more passive response, of
course, is that it could have consigned the courts to irrelevance.
Neither court took this tack. Rather, like U.S. federal courts faced with
inertial state-level institutions, they ventured into structural reform. The
solution they chose can also be described as a power grab, for under the new
model courts claim more power over states than under the declaratory model.
The states no longer get to decide what, exactly, compliance to the underlying
convention means. That decision is now in the hands of the courts. The next
part of this Article examines the strategies the human rights courts use to
construct the greater power they now claim.
II. How THEY Do IT: STRUCTURAL REFORM STRATEGIES
It is often said that the key difference between international and national
courts-mirroring perceptions about the difference between international and
national law-is that international courts cannot enforce their rulings. But this
86contrast is misconceived. National courts also lack the power of the purse and
sword. Like international courts, they belong to legal systems in which other
actors, most often national executives, are charged with enforcement. When, as
in public law litigation, national courts rule against the government, they are in
a similar position as an international human rights court: they have issued an
order against the very actor responsible for implementing the order.
Nonetheless, there are other salient differences in the position of
international as compared to national courts when they undertake the challenge
of issuing and supervising structural reform orders. These differences constrain
the strategies of judicial review that the international courts can exert with
success, and help explain the particular structural reform strategies the human
rights courts have forged.
Part II begins by distilling from the scholarship on comparative judicial
review two dimensions of variation among judicial review types: degree of
deference to states, and level of participation by actors beyond the judges.
Section II.B then examines how the differences in the position of national and
85. In certain situations, case-by-case adjudication can lead to policy change. For example,
the Brazilian Supreme Court, which does not follow stare decisis, issued order after order for the state to
provide HIV medication until, eventually, the government decided it was better to change its policy and
avoid firther litigation. See Hoffmann & Bentes, supra note 66. But this more gradual case-by-case
option was not available to the regional courts. The Inter-American Court could not use this form of
pressure because it relies on the Commission to send up cases, but the Commission refers under twenty
cases a year. The European Court, by contrast, has too many cases on its docket to effectively wait out
the state in the way the Brazilian Court did.
86. See Staton & Moore, supra note 15 (arguing that study of the two institutional types-
international and national courts-is divided by the same line that traditionally divided comparative and
international relations: the presumption of anarchy at the international level, which is no longer useful).
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international courts constrains the types of judicial review strategies the human
rights courts might adopt in issuing and supervising structural orders. Sections
II.C and II.D then examine two case studies of property rights judgments, one
before the Inter-American Court and one before the European Court, in order to
reveal the distinct strategies the courts use in their exercise of structural reform.
Part II concludes by analyzing the salient differences between the courts'
strategies.
A. National Courts and Structural Reform
The practice of judicial review by national courts has spread and
diversified in recent decades. Typologies that seek to categorize the emerging
varieties of judicial review emphasize two dimensions along which they vary
87that are relevant to the study of structural reform cases. The first source of
variation is the degree to which the court defers to the parties involved and to
the defendant state in particular. 88 In the ambit of structural reform, a low
degree of judicial deference is exemplified by U.S. courts' desegregation and
prison reform cases, in which judges would issue detailed remedial orders and
then appoint special masters to implement them.89 The judicial review practice
of Commonwealth courts, such as the U.K. courts' review powers under the
Human Rights Act, exemplifies a more deferential model: judges do not have
final say on the constitutionality of a particular piece of legislation, but can
only signal its incompatibility with constitutional obligations. 90 Similarly, the
practice of the South African Constitutional Court's review of socio-economic
rights under a flexible "reasonableness" standard exemplifies a relatively high
degree of deference to the defendant state.91
A second source of variation is the inclusion, and level of participation, of
other actors who have a stake in the ruling, whether or not they are a party to
the case. An important feature of constitutional review cases, and particularly
structural cases, is that the ruling has the potential to affect non-party interests.
To what degree are the voices of those non-party interests included in the
judicial processes of elaboration of the judgment and implementation of the
remedial order? An example of an inclusive process is that of the Colombian
Constitutional Court in the cases of internally displaced persons. After
declaring an "unconstitutional state of affairs" and issuing complex structural
87. For a sampling of such typologies, see STEPHEN GARDBAUM, THE NEW
COMMONWEALTH MODEL OF CONSTITUTIONALISM: THEORY AND PRACTICE (2013); THE GLOBAL
EXPANSION OF JUDICIAL POWER, supra note 2; TUSHNET, supra note 2; KATHERINE G. YOUNG,
CONSTITUTING ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RIGHTS (2012); Rodriguez-Garavito, supra note 67; Charles F.
Sabel & William H. Simon, Destablization Rights: How Public Law Litigation Succeeds, 117 HARv. L.
REV. 1015 (2004); Miguel Schor, Mapping Comparative Judicial Review, 7 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L.
REV. 257 (2008).
88. One might also classify review types by remedial practice. However, this study is focused
on comparing how courts issue structural remedies, so this dimension will not be explored.
89. Sabel & Simon, supra note 87, at 1017.
90. See GARDBAUM, supra note 87.
91. See Rosalind Dixon, Creating Dialogue about Socioeconomic Rights: Strong-Form
Versus Weak-Form Judicial Review Revisited, 5 INT'L J. OF CON. LAW 391, 397-98 (2007).
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orders, the Court held open hearings and encouraged participation of civil
society throughout the implementation stage.
92
Note that there can be variation on these dimensions through the lifetime
of a single structural reform case before a single court, particularly since
issuing a judgment and supervising implementation of an order are distinct
processes. 93 A court can issue a very specific remedial order at the judgment
stage, and then soften its stance and become more deferential during the
implementation. Similarly, a court may consider only the arguments of the
defendant and plaintiff at the judgment stage, and then open the
implementation phase to greater stakeholder participation.
Further, there can be variation on these dimensions through the lifetime
of a single court or judiciary. In a Harvard Law Review article that could be
read as the sequel to Chayes' famous piece, Professors Sabel and Simon argue
that the U.S. federal judiciary's practice of structural reform began as a
"command-and-control" style of review, but has shifted over time to what they
call "experimentalist." Experimentalist intervention "combines more flexible
and provisional norms with procedures for ongoing stakeholder participation
and measured accountability." 94 They show how in structural reform cases
dealing with schools, mental health institutions, prisons, police, and housing,
courts have increasingly included stakeholders in defining the remedies and the
timing and manner of their implementation. In other words, federal courts have
become more deferential to the parties involved, and have included in the
implementation stage more actors who have a stake in the ruling.
B. Are International Courts Different?
National courts, then, exhibit a wide variety of strategies and styles when
they issue and supervise structural orders. In seeking to understand the
structural reform practice of the international human rights courts, the first
question is whether they are categorically different from national courts. Are
their mandates so distinct, or their position vis-A-vis the state so different, that
they cannot use the same review strategies as national courts when they issue
and supervise structural orders? Or do they work under similar constraints and
employ structural reform strategies that vary along the same two dimensions of
deference and plurality? This section argues that four aspects of the structure
and position of the international human rights courts constrain the human rights
courts' structural reform strategies in distinctive ways. First, whereas national
courts have direct authority over the actors who run institutions targeted by
court orders, the international human rights courts have jurisdiction over only
one type of actor, the state. Second, many national courts are immersed in legal
systems that are more institutionalized than are international legal orders, and
they thus can rely on more well-developed doctrines and mechanisms for
92. Rodriguez-Garavito, supra note 67, at 1670, 1686.
93. See id.
94. Sabel & Simon, supra note 87, at 1019.
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asserting their authority. Third, international courts have less local knowledge,
and locals know less about them. Finally, international courts, as they are not
part of a classic separation of powers system, must have a different-if still
under-specified-source of legitimacy.
1. Jurisdiction over the Wrong Subject
National courts have jurisdiction over all kinds of state-actor defendants.
Plaintiffs can sue an individual public school teacher, the school principal, or
even the governor or President. In Brown v. Board of Education,95 therefore,
the party being sued before the federal courts was the institution that had direct
managerial authority over the schools to be targeted by reform. Human rights
courts, by contrast, can hear cases against only one type of defendant-the
state. In reform litigation, that means that national courts can address orders to
the bureaucracy directly charged with the matter that led to a violation, but
international courts can only direct orders to the state as a whole. This
difference is not significant when a court issues an order for monetary
compensation. In such a case, the executive branch, which represents the state
before the international court, is the actor called on to pay money to the
victim.96 It is not so different either if the court order requires something that
the executive-and better yet, the Foreign Ministry--can single-handedly
accomplish. Thus, the Inter-American Court's judgments ordering states to
apologize to their victims, or to name a road in memory of the victims, achieve
relatively high compliance rates.97 But as orders become more complex, and
their implementation requires involvement of more state actors, the
international court loses ground. Often they find themselves in the position of
ordering something that their main interlocutor, the executive, cannot single-
handedly accomplish.
One might object that this is also the case for national courts engaged in
structural reform. Critics of this practice in the United States suggest that the
courts' authority is too narrow and too shallow to be effective: "Too narrow
because the problems of public agencies were linked to myriad other
institutions and social practices, while a court's power extended only to the
parties before it. Too shallow because the operations of the agencies depended
on the street-level conduct of subordinates far below the court's view." 98 But
the difference is that the international court's relation of authority to the
relevant actor is mediated by at least one extra layer of actors-it
communicates exclusively through the state actor designated as representing
the state as a whole, usually the foreign ministry of the executive branch. This
matters because more intermediary actors mean more potential veto points.
95. Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
96. Further, such judgments for monetary compensation can be enforced through the
established method for enforcement of foreign judgments.
97. See Alexandra Huneeus, Courts Resisting Courts: Lessons from the Inter-American
Court's Struggle to Enforce Human Rights, 44 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 493 (2011).
98. Sabel & Simon, supra note 87, at 1017.
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Further, it gives the state more discretion as to how it responds to the violation.
The state in an international case may have discretion, for example, to choose
which state actor implements the order, whereas the national court order can
direct a particular state actor to action. 99 Finally, the reality is that a state actor
implicated by the court's order may even be unaware of the court's judgment,
undermining compliance.1
00
2. Where There Is No Special Master
A further complication is that the authority of an international court ruling
within national law varies from nation to nation. Some nations lean toward
monism, making international human rights court judgments directly binding
and justiciable in national law. Others are more dualist, meaning that court
judgments bind the nation-state under international law, but do not bind
individual actors within the state under national law (in the language of U.S.
foreign affairs law, the court judgment is non-self-executing). In those states
where an international court order is considered to be non-justiciable, an
incongruent situation can emerge in which the actor tasked with implementing
the reform and the actor upon whom the order is binding do not align. The state
as a whole has a legal duty to act under international law, but no single actor
has a legal duty to act under national law (and as natural persons, they are not
party to the human rights treaties, and so do not have a duty to act under
international law).101 Making matters worse, many nations have yet to work out
the exact legal effect of an international court ruling. This is especially the case
in the Inter-American System, wherein the Inter-American Court is working
hard to convince states that its rulings have direct effect (self-executing), but
has not yet won over all states. 102
Further, as international structural reform litigation is new, methods of
supervision are still under-developed. In their study of court-mandated prison
reforms in the United States, Malcolm Feeley and Edward Rubin attribute the
federal courts' effectiveness to the mechanisms of implementation that they
were able to deploy. Faced with recalcitrant officials, judges could threaten to
find them in civil or criminal contempt, meaning that judges could levy fines or
even throw them in jail. 10 3 One judge in a California prison reform litigation
99. This is not to deny that courts also face limits in this sense. As Sabel and Simon point out,
"[A] court's direct remedial authority operated mainly against senior officials (and even then, only with
severe limitations)." Id. at 3. It is just that the limits are greater for an international court.
100. See Huneeus, supra note 97.
101. See Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 498-99 (2008) (holding that the State of Texas does
not have a duty to comply with an international court order directed against the United States).
102. See GONGORO MERA, INTER-AMERICAN JUDICIAL CONSTITUTIONALISM: ON THE
CONSTITUTIONAL RANK OF HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES IN LATIN AMERICA THROUGH NATIONAL AND
INTER-AMERICAN ADJUDICATION 48-61, 65-83 (2011); see also ALLAN R. BREWER-CARiAS,
CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN LATIN AMERICA: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF
AMPARO PROCEEDINGS 163-76 (2009) (explaining a procedural institution in the Inter-American Court
known as amparo, which requires prompt remedy for rights recognized in the Convention).
103. MALCOLM M. FEELEY & EDWARD L. RUBIN, JUDICIAL POLICY MAKING AND THE
MODERN STATE: HOW THE COURTS REFORMED AMERICA'S PRISONS 124-25, 135, 322-23, 357 (1998).
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case went so far as to sentence each member of the prison's Board of
Supervisors "to five days in their own inadequate jail and 'tentatively' fined the
county $9,393,000, an enormous sum when measured against the county's
annual criminal justice budge of $75 million."' 04 But the authors place special
emphasis on another more frequently used tactic, which relies not on coercing
officials but replacing them. Under the Anglo-American equity tradition, courts
can place institutions in receivership, which means that their management is
taken over by the Court. 105 Of course, judges have neither the time nor
expertise to truly become managers of complex institutions. So, again drawing
from the Anglo-American equity tradition, they are able to appoint a special
master. In U.S. prison litigation cases, the courts appointed neutral outside
corrections experts to step in and manage the reform. This individual becomes
the manager who implements the orders of the court and is directly accountable
to the judge. Feeley and Rubin attribute much of the impact courts had to the
special master: "The duties of these special assistants varied widely . . but
everywhere they expanded the capacities of judges to understand problems,
formulate solutions and monitor compliance.'"
10 6
Courts outside the Anglo-American common-law tradition, and without
these strong tools, have in recent years found ways to undertake such litigation
by using more dialogic, soft-power mechanisms, such as issuing compliance
reports, hosting open public hearings, and appointing committees to supervise
107implementation. While fairly new to courts outside the United States, these
practices nonetheless have a longer track record than do the international
courts.
3. Information Deficit
The human rights courts oversee vast and diverse regions of the world:
the Inter-American Court has jurisdiction over twenty states and the European
Court presides over forty-seven. They thus handle information about many
different states' governments, laws, politics, and cultures and have less of a
sense of each particular national environment than might a national court.
Indeed, an international judge may not have stepped foot in the state against
which she issues a judgment. Even as she is well informed of the facts of the
104. Id. at 124.
105. See Liat Weingart, Receiverships in the Prison Litigation Context: Factors Necessary for
an Effective Judicial Remedy of Last Resort, 9 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL'Y & ETHICS J. 193, 196 n.13
(2010) ("An equity court can impose three categories of measures to ensure compliance with its orders:
first, a civil contempt sanction, in which the court can impose increasing levels of penalties on the
defendant to coerce compliance; second, the court can enjoin third parties from aiding the defendant in
its noncompliance; and lastly, the court may invoke 'in rem relief, in which the court or its officers
themselves do that which the defendant has refused to do."' (quoting James M. Hirschhorn, Where the
Money Is: Remedies to Financial Compliance with Strict Structural Litigation, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1815,
1826 (1984))).
106. Malcolm N. Feeley, Implementing Court Orders in the United States: Judges as
Executives, in JUDICIAL REVIEW AND BUREAUCRATIC IMPACT: INTERNATIONAL AND
INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES 221, 226 (Marc Hertogh & Simon Halliday eds., 2004).
107. See, e.g., Rodriguez-Garavito, supra note 67, at 1676 (arguing that "dialogic activism" is
an effective tool for implementation of structural judgments).
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case and the underlying treaties, she may know little about the surrounding
circumstances of the case.
The judges' distance from the local political situation is, of course, one of
the virtues of the international human rights courts and, to some extent, their
raison d'etre. Under a formalist view of law in which the judge deductively
applies the rule as strictly construed, abstraction from surrounding
circumstances is a virtue: it is the aspiration depicted by Lady Justice's
blindfold. Regardless of whether a legalist description of the judicial process is
ever accurate, it certainly fails to capture the role of the judge in fashioning and
then supervising structural remedies. In these cases, the judge is no longer
interpreting the text of the law. Rather, she moves from the task of adjudication
to that of instrumentally fashioning policy so as to reach certain (legally
required) outcomes. To use the language of Feeley and Rubin, at this point, the
judge moves from "interpretation of an authoritative text" to "selection of a
desirable result," or policymaking. 108 In this role, information about the
world-about the political, social, and legal setting of the institution that the
court is pushing the state to create or reform-is crucial. And here,
international courts will most often be at a disadvantage.'
0 9
International courts, in turn, figure less prominently than do national
courts in the mind of the public and in media coverage, particularly in the
Americas. 110 People likely have less information about their human rights
courts and treaties than about their national high court and constitution. This
too may pose an impediment to the effective implementation of the
international court's rulings-local actors may have to be educated before they
will comply.
4. International Court Legitimacy
At the national level, the normative legitimacy of national courts is
understood through the doctrine of separation of powers and democratic
theory. " Critics of structural reform cases point not only to the fact that judges
lack specialized knowledge about the areas of government bureaucracies they
strive to reform but to their lack of democratic credentials to undertake such
reform in the first place. Why should unelected judges fashion public policy?
The normative legitimacy of international human rights courts is also
traditionally rooted in the nation-state: they are created by treaties which, like
contracts, reflect the will of the parties thereto. However, as these courts take
108. FEELEY & RUBIN, supra note 103, at 7.
109. See Yonatan Lupu, International Judicial Legitimacy: Lessons from National Courts, 14
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 437, 450 (1998) ("[T]he process of accruing legitimacy is more difficult for
an international court than a national court because international courts have less information about their
audience's preferences."). One might counter that the U.S. federal courts have a similar disadvantage in
fashioning policies to be imposed in the state setting.
110. James L. Gibson & Gregory A. Caldeira, The Legitimacy of Transnational Legal
Institutions: Compliance, Support, and the European Court of Justice, 39 AM. J. POL. Sci. 459 (1995).
111. For the distinctior between normative and sociological legitimacy, see Nienke Grossman,
The Normative Legitimacy of f-,trnational Courts, 86 TEMP. L. REV. 61, 80 (2013).
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on new roles beyond their original mandates, and as their rulings increasingly
affect third parties and shape policy arenas, the contractual model of legitimacy
falters. Many scholars are currently trying to ground the legitimacy of
international courts, seeking theories to justify and guide their exercise of
power. 112 But there is little consensus on the normative legitimacy of the
emerging international judiciary. In this way, their exercise of power, and the
project of mandating and supervising structural reform, is especially contested
and in many ways on less stable normative footing than the analogous work of
national courts. In terms of the task of convincing different audiences to accept
their authority, then, international courts face added challenges. Further,
convincing different audiences-and in particular executives, national judges,
and the public-to accept their authority may be harder if they are perceived as
outsiders imposing a foreign human rights ideal on a local matter. Finally, these
courts have a much broader and more diverse set of audiences than do national
courts: the European Court has over 800 million people and forty-seven states
within its jurisdiction, and the Inter-American Court has roughly 600 million
people and twenty states within its jurisdiction. The task of constructing their
authority is thus much more complex and will vary across states and subject
areas.
When they embark on structural reform, then, international courts face
certain challenges unique to the international sphere. The next section describes
two case studies in order to reveal the strategies that international human rights
courts employ to overcome these challenges.
C. Rights Review in the Americas
The Inter-American Human Rights System has two main organs: the
Commission, based in Washington, D.C., and the Court, based in San Jose,
Costa Rica. While the Commission is a non-judicial organ, charged with such
tasks as promotion of human rights, it is also the first step in the individual
petition system that leads to the Inter-American Court. Individuals file a
petition against their state before the Commission, which then tries to resolve
the issue by working with the state and victims towards a friendly settlement. If
this fails, however, the Commission submits the case to the Court. But its role
does not end there. In the Inter-American System, there are three distinct
parties to any case before the Court: the defendant state; the victims, usually
represented by an NGO; and the Commission, which presents its own
independent view of the case. The Commission accepted 123 individual
112. See, e.g., U.N. HUMAN RIGHTS TREATY BODIES: LAW AND LEGITIMACY (Helen Keller &
Geir Ulfstein eds., 2012); Joseph Conti, Producing Legitimacy at the World Trade Organization: The
Role of Expertise and Legal Capacity, 8 SocIo-ECON. REV. 131 (2010); Aaron Fichtelberg, Democratic
Legitimacy and the International Criminal Court: A Liberal Defense, 4 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 765 (2006);
Gibson & Caldeira, supra note 110; Grossman, supra note 111; Lupu, supra note 109, at 442; Yuval
Shany, Assessing the Effectiveness of International Courts: A Goal-Based Approach 106 AM. J. INT'L L.
225 (2012); Erik Voeten, Public Opinion and the Legitimacy of International Courts, 14 THEORETICAL
INQUIRIES L. 411 (2013).
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petitions in 2013 and referred eleven cases to the Court. 13
The Court, in turn, adjudicates the case, declaring whether the state has
violated the underlying human rights convention and ordering remedial action.
As noted earlier, the Court has also taken on the task of supervising the
implementation of its remedial orders. It also has the power to issue
preliminary measures, a form of injunctive relief designed to stop an immediate
harm while the Court adjudicates a case. 114 The Inter-American Court has
seven judges, meets four times a year, typically decides under twenty
contentious cases per year, and runs on a slim budget of roughly $4 million per
year. In 2013, it issued thirteen judgments on the merits in contentious cases,
twenty-six compliance reports, and three new provisional measures.
In order to understand the distinguishing features of the Inter-American
Court's structural reform practice, it is illustrative to focus on the trajectory of a
single case, which will then be compared to a case in the Council of Europe
setting. As cases having to do with the right to property account for an
important subset of structural cases in both systems, the comparison will
involve two precedent-setting property cases that are nonetheless representative
of each System's distinct remedial and supervisory practice: Comunidad
Moiwana v. Suriname and Hutten-Czapska v. Poland.
The Inter-American Court has been an innovator in developing the law of
indigenous rights, with a series of landmark cases defining, most notably, a
right to collectively owned property based on traditional usage. In Comunidad
Moiwana v. Suriname, the Court extended this right to a non-indigenous
maroon community in Suriname. 16 This case, with which Suriname has
partially complied, has received three compliance reports. Together with the
ruling, the reports provide a window into the Inter-American Court's structural
reform strategies.
The Moiwana case involves a state-sponsored massacre of at least thirty-
nine members of a rural Afro-indigenous community in the sparsely inhabited
forests of Suriname. It took place on November 29, 1986, but only came before
the Court in 2005. While the case before the Commission focused on the state's
failure to prosecute and provide compensation for the crime, the Court's ruling
113. INTER-AMERICAN COMM'N ON HUMAN RIGHTS, ANNUAL REPORT 2013, at 41, 55 (2013),
http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/docs/annual/2013/docs-en/AnnualReport-Chap2A-B.pdf.
114. Although preliminary measures are meant to be very immediate and individualized, some
of the Court's orders in these cases have structural dimensions, such as when the order has to do with
the treatment of prisoners who may be subject to an immediate, irreparable harm due to prison
conditions. However, these cases will not be discussed here as they are not formally aimed at fixing a
systemic situation. For a discussion of provisional measures, see CLARA BURBANO HERRERA,
PROVISIONAL MEASURES IN THE CASE LAW OF THE INTER-AMERICAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS
(2010).
115. INTER-AMERICAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, ANNUAL REPORT 2013, at 30, 40, 71
(2014), http://www.corteidh.or.cr/sitios/informes/docs/ENG/eng_2013.pdf.
116. Moiwana Community v. Suriname, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and
Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 124 (June 15, 2005); see also Thomas M. Antkowiak, Moiwana
Village v. Suriname: A Portal into Recent Jurisprudential Developments of the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights, 25 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 268 (2007) (arguing for the significance of the Moiwana case
to the Court's evolution).
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also focused on the community's property rights and social conditions.
Following the massacre, members of the community were forced to abandon
their traditional lands and try to survive elsewhere, internally displaced or in
exile in French Guiana. The Court ruled that, in violation of the American
Convention, the state of Suriname never undertook a serious effort to determine
criminal responsibility, nor did it compensate or aid the surviving community
members. 117 It ordered eight main remedial actions: (1) investigating and
punishing the underlying crimes, (2) finding and identifying the remains of the
victims, (3) granting the Moiwana Community collective title to their
traditional lands, (4) guaranteeing the community members safe access should
they choose to return to their traditional land, (5) creating a development fund
to reconstruct the property of the community and provide health and education
services, (6) issuing a public apology, (7) creating a public monument in
memory of the massacre, and (8) providing monetary reparations. 1' The
Moiwana case qualifies as a structural case, as defined above,' 19 because the
judgment challenges a government policy that applies to an entire
community, 120 provides injunctive relief that mandates government change,
and, as will be shown below, involves the Court in the long-term supervision of
structural changes.
Some of the judgment's remedial orders were written in vague language
that gives the state considerable discretion. The order to delimit Moiwana
territory and to grant collective title, for example, stated only that the state shall
"adopt such legislative, administrative and other measures as are necessary to
ensure the property rights of the members of the Moiwana community in
relation to the traditional territories from which they were expelled." 12' The
state, in other words, can choose the means. But some of the orders are more
detailed. The Court indicates that once the Moiwana people return to their
village, the state must maintain an ongoing dialogue with victims: "[T]he State
shall send representatives every month to Moiwana Village during the first
year, in order to consult with the Moiwana residents." 122 The orders to create
the development fund are also detailed: the state must create an implementing
117. Because Suriname acceded to the American Convention only in 1987, the state's
responsibility for the crimes themselves was not before the Court. American Convention on Human
Rights: Signatures and Current Status ofRatification, INTER-AMERICAN COMM'N ON HUMAN RIGHTS,
http://www.cidh.org/Basicos/English/Basic4.Amer.Conv.Ratif.htm (last visited Dec. 4, 2014).
118. Moiwana Community v. Suriname, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations & Costs,
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 124, 233.11(June 15, 2005) [hereinafter Moiwana v. Suriname-
Judgment].
119. See supra Section I.B.
120. In some senses this is a borderline structural reform litigation case because the litigants
appeared in the name of the entire community, and so the community itself should be conceptualized as
a party to the case. However, as in other indigenous rights cases, the Court orders the state to create a
mechanism for delimiting and granting land, and in this sense is mandating the creation ofan institution,
one which will have effects on third parties beyond the Moiwana community. See Moiwana v.
Suriname- Judgment, I 209-10. Further, the housing, health, and education programs, as well as the
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committee within six months, and the committee must oversee the
implementation of a US$1.2 million development fund to establish, within five
years, community health, housing, and educational programs for the Moiwana
community members. Further, the Court specifies the composition of the
committee and orders that it be in place within six months of the judgment.
Notably, the Court weaves a threat directly into the order: if the state fails to
create the implementation committee, it will be asked to explain itself before
the Court in Costa Rica. 123 These orders, if not unusual by Inter-American
standards, are more specific than those of the European Court. The Inter-
American Court appears to subscribe to the theory that more specific remedial
orders engender greater compliance, 124 and that threats-even if only threats to
report back to the Court-also boost compliance.
After judgment, the Inter-American contentious cases move into the
compliance phase.125 In assessing compliance, the Court relies on information
supplied by the three parties. After receiving the state's self-report on the
implementation of the remedial measures, the Court provides the
representatives of the victims and the Commission the opportunity to comment
and provide more information. Drawing on this information, it then determines
whether or not the state has complied with each of the remedial measures
ordered in the original judgment. If the state has not yet fully complied, the
Court publishes a compliance report indicating steps the state needs to take. In
this sense, the compliance reports are not only assessments of compliance, but
also guides toward implementation.' 26 At times the Court also concludes it does
not have enough information to make an assessment and requests more
information. In the Moiwana case, the Court issued its first compliance report
in 2007. The twenty-one-page document couples summaries of the information
and comment provided by each of the three parties with the Court's assessment
of the level of compliance with each order. 127 In 2009, the Court issued a
second report, noting the state had failed to provide required information and
calling the parties to a closed hearing in Costa Rica in January of 2010.128 After
123. Id. IM214-15.
124. Jeffrey K. Staton & George Vanberg, The Value of Vagueness: Delegation, Defiance and
Judicial Opinions, 3 AM. J. POL. SCI. 504, 504 (2008) (arguing that "established line of research
demonstrates that vague judicial opinions are less likely to be implemented than clear opinions")
125. See David C. Baluarte, Strategizing for Compliance: The Evolution of a Compliance
Phase of Inter-American Court Litigation and the Strategic Imperative for Victims' Representatives, 27
AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 263, 270 (2012).
126. Note the ambiguity in the legal status of the compliance reports. While the Court's
judgments have binding force under the American Convention, compliance reports are not mentioned in
the Convention. However, the Court does have the power to keep the case open until it deems the state
has fully complied and thus to determine what that compliance means. In this way, the Court bolsters
the persuasive power of guidelines it sets in the compliance reports.
127. Moiwana Community v. Suriname, Monitoring Compliance with Judgments (Inter-Am.
Ct. H.R. Nov. 21, 2007), http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/supervisiones/moiwana211107_ing.pdf
[hereinafter Moiwanna v. Suriname- 2007 Compliance Report].
128. Moiwana Community v. Suriname, Monitoring Compliance with Judgments, Order of the
President of the Court, "Having Seen," 1.7 (Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. Dec. 18, 2009),
http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/supervisiones/moiwana 18 12 09.pdf [hereinafter Moiwanna v.
Suriname- 2009 Compliance Report].
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that meeting, the Court issued its third compliance report, this time twenty-
three pages long.
129
Seen through the lens of the Court's compliance reports, two features of
the ongoing dialogue over the implementation of the Court's order stand out.
The first is the importance of the participation of the Commission and of the
victims. The state is the main source of information; its reports highlight the
different steps it has taken. But the victims respond by pointing out any and all
shortfalls with the state's actions. For example, in the 2010 Supervision, in
response to the Court's order to "establish a community development fund for
health, housing and educational programs," Suriname reports:
[B]ecause the Moiwana Community is still in French Guiana, an
independent consultant was hired in order to inquire as to whether the
members of the Community were willing to return, the type of houses they
preferred, and where they wanted the houses to be located. According to
the State, Community members responded that they wanted the houses to
be located at the original site, so construction begun there. However, it was
halted for new consultations with a neighboring indigenous community.
Additionally, the State decided, in consultation with the Moiwana
Community, not to undertake the construction of a school or medical
center, given that the Community had identified the construction of
housing as its top priority. The State indicated that it had earmarked USS
1,200,000.00 ... for this purpose and submitted a schedule showing that
this amount was to be paid in five installments over the years 2006 to
2010.... Furthermore, five houses have already been built, two more are
almost complete, and the foundations of five more have been laid ...
Finally, the State indicated that the execution of the SSDI project (supra
Considering Clause 19) is "in a final phase."' 130
The state, in other words, portrayed itself as having taken concrete
steps toward compliance. But the victims dispute this rosy picture. They
argue, for example, that "it is entirely possible that the five houses
constructed by the State are in a location that will not be agreed to by the
indigenous peoples and other Cottica N'djuka communities and [... ] will
therefore have to be dismantled and moved elsewhere." 131 The
representatives also complained that the state had not yet transferred the
"full amount of funds to the development committee," and that the state
will be unable to provide "[h]ouses, a school[,] and [a] health centre . . .
until such time as the precise location of the lands in question is ... legally
recognised and secured." 132 The representatives at times even use the
opportunity of commenting on compliance to secure further concessions
from the state. 133 For its part, the Commission echoes some but not all of
129. Moiwana Community v. Suriname, Monitoring Compliance with Judgments, Order of the
Court (Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. Nov. 22, 2010), http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/supervisiones/moiwana_22
11 10_ing.pdf [hereinafter Moiwanna v. Suriname- 2010 Compliance Report].
130. Id. "Considering That," 17.
131. Id. "Considering That," 18 (alteration in original).
132. Id.
133. The representatives take this opportunity to complain that the state should put the
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the criticisms and tends to acknowledge more of the state's actions. From
these three sources, the Court then draws its own conclusions. What is
striking, however, is that the Court gives so much space to the parties'
views, quoting them extensively in its own compliance reports. Each of the
parties' positions and factual allegations, including in particular the victim's
worries and concerns, are published and made public through the
compliance report--even those that are not taken up by the Court.
The closed hearings similarly reveal the importance of the participation of
the parties in the ongoing dialogue toward compliance. In this sense, the
Moiwana case provides a negative example. Usually, compliance reports that
follow on a closed hearing are rife with new ideas about how to accomplish
compliance. In these hearings, the three parties meet with the judges to have a
conversation about implementation. The parties often accord a new plan of
action complete with a chronogram. In the Moiwana case, the state's
commitment to the process is reflected in the party that it sent to Costa Rica,
which included the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Regional
Development, the Head of the Human Rights Bureau, and Chair of the
Commission on the Implementation of the Moiwana Judgment. 134 These were
clearly actors who could influence implementation based on the outcome of the
meeting. 35 However, the representatives of the victims were at the last minute
unable to attend the meeting, and thus no accords were reached in this case.
The second notable feature of the Inter-American Court's compliance
phase is the depth of direct involvement of the judges in the supervision
process. Like U.S. federal judges in structural reform cases, the judges become
engaged in policy-making and implementation. The Moiwana compliance
reports discuss in some detail questions such as whether the state's method of
demarcation of Moiwana territory places "undue reliance on community land
use mapping" and relies too little on "indigenous and tribal peoples' customs,
laws, values and land tenure systems." 136 The parties also discuss the
placement of the five houses that the state has already constructed, 137 how
much say the state should have in approving spending by the development
fund, 138 and whether the five houses built by the state were built in the correct
place. In other structural reform cases, the judges have gotten into such details
as what lines of investigation a national prosecution should follow,' 39 and
whether the terms of a new law restricting military jurisdiction fulfills
Development Fund money that has not yet been given to the Fund in an account in the name of
community so that the community, rather than the state, can receive the interest while the Fund is still
being set up. This was not part of the original judgment, but the state concedes to do so. Moiwanna v.
Suriname- 2007 Compliance Report, "Whereas," 17-18; see also Moiwanna v. Suriname- Judgement,
TI 213-15.
134. Moiwana v. Suriname- 2010 Compliance Report, "Having Seen," 8 n.1.
135. The absence of any actor with prosecutorial or judicial powers is problematic, especially
as this is the order in which the state has done the least.
136. Id. "Having Seen," 22.
137. Id. "Having Seen," %[J 34-37.
138. Moiwana v. Suriname- 2007 Compliance Report, "Having Seen," I 7(e).
139. Huneeus, supra note 37, at 10-11.
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standards previously set by the Court.140 If this seems intrusive, it is important
to recall that the Court can only enter into as much detail as the state and other
parties provide: in this sense the state's cooperation is prerequisite (even if, in
the Court's view, it is also legally required). Further, in the closed hearings, the
judges play a role not of adjudication or policymaking but of mediators
counseling the parties toward agreement. In these sessions, the judges leave the
bench to sit around a table with the parties and, over the course of the session,
guide them towards a shared plan of action, which then becomes the guide for
subsequent supervisions, and the subject of court enforcement.
D. Rights Review in Europe
Next to the Inter-American Court, the European Court of Human Rights
is a behemoth. It has a budget of C66,815,100, 141 a bench of forty-seven
judges,142 and in 2013 issued 916 judgments. 143 The Council of Europe system
no longer has an equivalent to the Inter-American Commission: individuals in
the forty-seven states that are part of the Council of Europe system can petition
directly to the Court. The Court then adjudicates the case, deciding if there has
been a violation of the European Convention and, if so, it may order remedies.
Traditionally, after the Court issues a ruling, the supervision of implementation
of the judgment falls entirely to the Committee of Ministers, an inter-
ministerial body in the Council of Europe system. As argued above, however,
the European human rights system has taken a structural turn, particularly
through its creation of a new "pilot procedure," which for the first time
involves the Court in the implementation phase.
A case that illustrates the distinctive features of the European Court's
pilot cases is Hutten-Czapska v. Poland, decided in 2006.144 Hutten qualifies as
a structural reform case because the Court demanded injunctive relief that
changed government policy and had implications beyond the litigant; and the
Court then became involved in long-term supervision of the order. Like
Moiwana v. Suriname, and like many of the structural cases before both courts,
this was a property rights case. But whereas Moiwana asserted a right to
collective title based on traditional usage, Hutten found that rent-stabilization
controls first put in place under communism violate the right to private
property under the Convention. The rent control system at issue made it
impossible for landowners to profit from renting their property. Finding that a
140. Radilla Pacheco v. Mexico, Monitoring Compliance with Judgment, Order of the Court,
"Considering," IM 18-29 (Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. May 14, 2013), http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs
/supervisiones/radilla 14 05_13 ing.pdf. What is notable about this process of assessing whether a new
piece of legislation satisfies its judgment means the Court reviews state legislation not in a coacrete case
or controversy, but as if it had the power to conduct abstract review.
141. European Court of Human Rights: How the Court Works, COUNCIL OF EUR.
http://echr.coe.int/Pages/home.aspx?p=court/howitworks (last visited Dec. 4, 2014).
142. Annual Report 2013, EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, 17, 18 (2013),
http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Annualreport_2013-ENG.pdf.
143. Id. at 197.
144. Hutten-Czapska v. Poland, App. No. 35014/97, 2006-VIII Eur. Ct. H.R. (June 19, 2006).
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similar situation affected 100,000 property-owners and up to 900,000 renters,
the Court, through a June 19, 2006 judgment, declared that there was a
systemic problem underlying the case, and issued a pilot judgment. In so doing,
it froze roughly eighteen similar cases also filed before the Court (but one of
which encompassed the claims of roughly 200 property owners). The Court
held that Poland's existing rent control regime, coupled with the lack of a
system for landlords to petition for and recuperate losses incurred through
renting their property, violated the European Convention of Human Rights.
Further, the Court stated in the judgment's remedial section that in order to end
the systemic violation, the state must, "through appropriate legal and/or other
measures, secure in its domestic legal order a mechanism maintaining a fair
balance between the interests of landlords and the general interest of the
community .. . in accordance with the standards of protection of property
rights under the Convention.'
45
The Court thus imposed on the state the duty to create a different system
for property rental. Note that the order is not specific: it does not tell Poland
what means it should use, or who should lead the effort to create the new
system. The state can implement the measure through legislative and/or
administrative actions of its choosing. However, the Court does suggest that the
Polish Constitutional Court, in an earlier ruling, had recommended a system
that would satisfy the state's obligations.
46
After the pilot judgment, the Hutten plaintiffs and the Polish government
worked with the Court's Registry to reach a friendly settlement agreement,
which they submitted to the Court for approval in 2008. In its friendly
settlement judgment, the Court examined not only whether the plaintiffs had
been made whole, but also whether the steps the Polish government had taken
toward improving the underlying systemic problem satisfied its original
ruling. 147 It found that the state had largely complied by enacting several
housing laws, including an amending statute
whereby a number of provisions of the 2001 Act, most notably on the
determination of rent, the criteria for judicial control of rent increases and
the civil liability of municipalities for failure to provide social
accommodation to protected tenants, were repealed or changed with a
view to implementing two judgments of the Polish Constitutional
Court .... Furthermore, the State introduced an information system for
monitoring levels of rent within Poland, a tool designed to assist civil
courts in resolving disputes arising from rent increases by landlords. It also
set up a system of subsidies available to the local government or public
benefit organisations for the construction of buildings or dwellings
designated for social accommodation or other forms of accommodation for
the less well-off. 1
48
The list of steps that Poland had successfully taken in compliance with
145. Id. 239.
146. Id 199.
147. Hutten-Czapska v. Poland, App. No. 35014/97, 2008 Eur. Ct. H.R. (Apr. 28, 2008).
148. Id. 37.
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the judgment continued. The Court concluded not only by endorsing the
friendly settlement but also by striking the case from its list. However, it kept
the pilot procedure in place in light of the related cases, and it left certain
questions of implementation pending for supervision by the Committee of
Ministers. 149 The Court, in other words, and in contradiction to its tradition,
chose to remain involved in the implementation of its 2006 judgment. It falls to
the Court to decide whether it should strike a case from its list in light of a
friendly settlement. The Court decided that in the context of a friendly
settlement reached, as in the present case, after delivery of a pilot judgment on
the merits of the case, the notion of "respect for human rights" requires the
Court to examine the case also from the point view of "relevant general
measures."'150 It thus created "an alternate 'route' . . . that to a certain extent
avoids the procedure before the Committee of Ministers by concentrating at the
Court." In 2011, the Court issued a ruling striking out the remaining
associated rent control cases from its list and closing the Pilot Procedure.
52
Even where there is no friendly settlement, however, the Court takes on a
greater than usual role in supervision through the pilot procedure. Under the
Convention, the Committee of Ministers alone is charged with supervision of
judgments. Under the Pilot Procedure system, however, the Court is charged
with deciding when to open and when to close the pilot procedure; when
repetitive cases should be stayed pending a state's implementation to the orders
issued by a pilot judgment; and when, "in the event of the failure of the
Contracting State concerned to comply with the operative provisions of a pilot
judgment, the Court shall resume its examination of the applications which
have been adjourned." 153 Once the Court rescinds the Pilot status, the
Committee of Ministers can continue supervision of the cases on a one-by-one
basis.' 54 Another way the Court stays involved is that "if the national measures
taken to remedy a violation found by the Court raise a new legal issue ... the
Court feels free to deal with the complaint, regardless of the findings of the
149. Id. 42 ("While the Government's proposal can obviously be regarded as an important
step towards securing the requisite fair balance between the interests of landlords and the general
interest of the community, it will fall to the Committee of Ministers to assess what impact this measure
would have-if adopted--on the implementation of the principal judgment.").
150. Hutten-Czapska v. Poland, App. No. 35014/97, 2008 Eur. Ct. H.R. (Apr. 28, 2008)
(Ziemele, J., concurring).
151. Janneke Gerards, The Pilot Judgment Procedure before the European Court of Human
Rights as an Instrument for Dialogue, in CONSTITUTIONAL CONVERSATIONS IN EUROPE: ACTORS,
TopiCs, AND PROCEDURES 8 (Monica Claes et al. eds., 2012).
152. Hutten-Czapska v. Poland, App. No. 35014/97, 2011 Eur. Ct. H.R. (Mar. 31, 2011).
153. Ass'n of Real Prop. Owners in Lodz v. Poland, App. No. 3485/02, 2011 Eur. Ct. H.R.
(Mar. 8, 2011).
154. Thus, after the Court declared that the cases joined with Hutten were struck from the
Court's list, the Committee of Ministers returned the cases to its regular track for supervision of a few
pending matters. Case Against Poland, Decision, Comm. of Ministers, Council of Eur., No. 7 (June 8,
2011), https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=1796965&Site=COE (noting that in this decision "the
European Court observed that compensatory refunds are available only to those persons whose property
was subject to the rent-control scheme during any period between 12/11/1994 and 25/04/2005, whereas
the systemic violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 continued after 25/04/2005," and transferring the
case for examination under the standard procedure).
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Committee [of Ministers]."' 155 Finally, a new, informal practice of
communication between the Committee and Court is emerging. The
Committee's annual report of 2012 notes that the Court has turned to "more
and more frequent use of letters to the [Committee of Ministers]" to weigh in
on issues of concern, "such as the development of the number of repetitive
cases pending before it," and other issues that it deems require the Committee
of Minister's supervision. The Committee finds that this "new practice allows
better exchange of relevant information in real time and is thus an interesting
contribution to the efficiency of the Committee of Minister's supervision
procedure."'
156
Several features of the Hutten case are worth noting. First, there is a
tension between resolving the pilot case and deciding whether the associated
cases that are frozen pending the pilot case resolution are also resolved. This,
of course, is the classic problem in class action cases. But what is notable is
that the pilot procedure puts the Court in the position of making this decision,
giving it a greater role than ever before in the supervision of the
implementation of remedies. Another notable feature, to be discussed below, is
that this system of structural reform shuts out the similarly situated victims not
in the pilot case. Their cases are simply frozen pending resolution. Finally, the
system introduces into the supervisory state another set of actors not present in
the Inter-American setting or in national settings: the other state parties that are
not subject to the order, who participate in the supervision through the
Committee of Ministers. These features, and the contrast with the Inter-
American system, are further explored below.
E. International Review Strategies
Much of the scholarly debate surrounding structural reform litigation
concerns the question of whether courts can ever be effective in the non-
adjudicative activity of defining and implementing institutional reform. While
Chayes argued that the federal courts were well suited to act as a last resort for
reforming inertial and malfunctioning state institutions, others objected that
judges did not have adequate information or training, and that courts did not
have jurisdiction over the proper set of actors and institutions to implement
meaningful reform.157 Sabel and Simon counter, in turn, that by using more
experimentalist methods, courts are able to bypass some of these institutional
limits. 158 Through inclusive dialogues that bring the parties and other
stakeholders to the table, courts are able to pressure the differing sides to work
together, accord a reform plan, and implement it. Courts use a mix of hard and
soft power to destabilize the status quo and overcome blockages and
155. Gerards, supra note 151, at 17-18.
156. COUNCL OF EUR., supra note 47, at 17.
157. See Colin S. Diver, The Judge as Political Powerbroker: Superintending Structural
Change in Public Institutions, 65 VA. L. REV. 43, 49-64 (1979); Donald L. Horowitz, Decreeing
Organizational Change: Judicial Supervision of Public Institutions, 1983 DUKE L.J. 1265, 1288-95.
158. See Sabel & Simon, supra note 87, at 1100-01.
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communication problems that may stall reform. 159
The case suggests that, like the U.S. federal courts studied by Sabel and
Simon, the human rights courts overcome the challenges they face in ordering
and supervising structural remedies by using more dialogic and experimentalist
strategies. As noted above, while international and national courts face similar
constraints and have similar structures, there are several important differences
that make the practice of ordering and supervising structural reform particularly
challenging for human rights courts. First, the human rights courts have
jurisdiction over states, not individual state entities or natural persons, and thus
their link to those in charge of changing structures on the ground is more
remote. Second, as they are new at this, the human rights courts have less well-
developed mechanisms for asserting supervisory control. The human rights
courts' strategic response to these challenges has been to create dialogic
encounters with relevant parties. Both systems involve parties that play a role
in the implementation and compliance conferences. Through these meetings,
progress is evaluated, obstacles to implementation become clearer, and the
parties work together to make plans and schedules in order to implement the
orders. Further, both systems use compliance progress reports as a shaming
tool to apply extra pressure toward compliance.
Lack of information about the local context and tenuous legitimacy are
the other particularly challenging issues that human rights courts face. Here,
the strategic response has been to heighten stakeholder participation and to
hold meetings and hearings during the implementation phase. By involving
parties whose interests are affected by the judgment, such as victims and other
states, the courts are able to legitimate themselves through the principle that
those affected by their rule participate in its making. 16 Further, the involved
parties have information about the local context and can educate the courts and
Committee of Ministers through these dialogic encounters.
On the whole, then, it seems that international human rights courts tend to
adopt dialogic and inclusive methods of supervision in the structural reform
setting. Yet, as will be discussed below, there are important differences
between the courts on the dimensions of deference and of who gets to
participate in the supervisory stage.
1. Deference to the State
The structural reform practice of the Inter-American Court is more
judicially directed and less deferential to states than that of the Euoprean Court
of Human Rights. To this day, it is a judicial invention that grew organically
159. Sabel and Simon provide a list of mechanisms by which such destabilization occurs. Id. at
1073-81. For example, if a new, untried system of doing things is being considered, each player will be
less able to "anticipate what the reform will mean for her," and thus she will be less able to make a
decision based purely on self-interest. Id. at 1074.
160. While this is a fundamental aspect of normative legitimacy, it speaks as well to
sociological legitimacy. Tom Tyler's research on procedural justice shows that those who have voice
and participate in judicial procedures view them as more legitimate, and are more likely to comply, even
when they lose. See TOM TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 62, 163 (2006).
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from the Court's general caseload. The Inter-American Court does not
officially distinguish cases that involve structural problems from other cases. It
simply began, in 2001, to add remedial measures that, if nominally aimed at
restituting the victim, had more general effects. By contrast, in the European
System the call for creation of a special path for systemic cases came first from
the Committee of Ministers. In its 2004 report, the Committee of Ministers
encouraged the Court to move in this direction.'61 A month later, the Court
announced its first pilot case. 62 Thus, it was a political body--one whose
members directly represent state interests-that made the first push. The
practice was then endorsed by the Group of Wise Persons. 63 Still missing from
the Inter-American story is an explicit state endorsement of the practice.'
The Inter-American Court's practice also emphasizes judicial discretion
in that it issues more detailed remedial orders. The European Court's orders at
the judgment stage are more general and thus deferential. Where they do
mention policy solutions, they refer to policies already discussed by state
actors, such as local court rulings. Further, the American judges are more
directly involved in supervision. While the European Court has taken on a
growing share of the supervision in pilot cases, it shares this role with, and
relies heavily upon, the Committee of Ministers. The Inter-American Court, by
contrast, undertakes supervision on its own. As a result, its judges meet with
the parties in closed hearings, and in the course of the compliance reports,
delve deeply into the particulars of the implementation process.
By taking on a more judicially directed strategy, the Inter-American
Court arguably risks greater noncompliance. It seems clear that where courts
give states a greater hand in defining the remedy, they will achieve a greater
compliance rate. It is difficult to compare the compliance rates of the systems,
precisely because of their remedial and structural differences.' 65 However, it is
noteworthy that in over eighty cases in which it has issued structural remedies
and supervised compliance, the Inter-American Court has deemed that states
have fully complied in five cases. 166 The upside of the judicially directed
approach is that the Court is able to hold states to a more stringent standard,
and thus gives domestic groups with an interest in the matter a sharper tool
with which to pressure for reform.
161. See Council of Eur. Comm. of Ministers, supra note 49.
162. Broniowski v. Poland, App. No. 31443/96 2004-V Eur. Ct. H.R. (June 22, 2004).
163. Report of the Group of Wise Persons to the Committee of Ministers, COUNCIL OF EUR.,
105 (Nov. 15, 2006), https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=1063779&Site=CM ("The Group supports
these developments.").
164. The Inter-American Court rejected Panama's challenge to the practice of supervision. See
Baena-Ricardo v. Panama, Competence, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 104, 100-04 (Nov. 28,
2003). Since then, states have seemingly accepted the practice, but they have not explicitly endorsed it.
165. Courtney Hillebrecht, Rethinking Compliance: The Challenges and Prospects of
Measuring Compliance with International Human Rights, I J. HUM. RTS. PRAc. 362 (2009).
166. See supra note 10.
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2. Stakeholder Participation
Both courts emphasize the inclusion of stakeholders beyond the defendant
state. But here, too, their strategies differ. A striking feature of the Inter-
American System is the level of participation allowed to the victims. Victims
participate in each of the proceedings before the Court, including the
supervision phase and the closed hearings. Furthermore, the victims' opinions
about implementation of each of the measures-including the general
measures-are given voice through ample quotes in the compliance reports.
This system resembles U.S. federal judicial practice, in which implementation
of a court's decree is a matter to be litigated through adversarial contest. But
the Inter-American Court goes even further. In its rulings and supervision
reports, the Inter-American Court at times demands that the victim be included
in the process of elaborating and implementing policies. This concern with the
victim is a feature of the Inter-American System in general. The victim's
participation could be viewed as a type of remedy in itself, and as a form of
procedural justice. Indeed, a skeptic might suggest, voice in the judicial process
is the only kind of justice the victims will achieve, as compliance to orders is
low in the Inter-American System. 167 Lacking strong tools to ensure
implementation, perhaps the Court instead seeks to provide justice through
voice in the process. 168 In the European System's cases, by contrast, the role of
the victim is less of an emphasis. Nowhere in the Committee of Ministers
reports on compliance, for example, do the victims' views appear.69
In the European System, supervision is shared between the Committee of
Ministers, which is a state-directed body, and the Court.170 Further, proceedings
before the Committee of Ministers, itself a political body, emphasize dialogue
with the member states. 171 Thus, while the emphasis in the Inter-American
System is on closed hearings between the victim, the state, and the
Commission, the Committee of Ministers has been hosting roundtables in
which not the victims but other states weigh in to discuss how to best
implement certain kinds of systemic reforms. It is as if, in the United States,
federal courts invited representatives of the different states to participate in
implementation hearings of structural reform orders. These features all point to
a practice more attuned to state politics in the European setting. This seems
167. Darren Hawkins & Wade Jacoby, Partial Compliance: A Comparison of the European
and Inter-American Courts for Human Rights, 6 J. INT'L L. & INT'L REL. 35 (2010) (comparing
compliance in the European and American human rights systems).
168. l owe this point to Monica Hakimi.
169. The more marginal role of the victims in the European system is further exemplified by
the practice of suspending repetitive cases while the pilot procedure unfolds. Similarly situated victims
are thus left in limbo while the pilot case judgment is implemented. By contrast, when the Inter-
American System considers similar cases brought against the same state, each gets a separate hearing.
170. In the Inter-American System, the Court directs the supervision unilaterally. The
Commission participates, but the Commission, like the Court, is an autonomous organ staffed by
experts, not state representatives.
171. For an argument that the Inter-American Court gives "insufficient consideration to the
consent of the regional community of states," see Gerald L. Neuman, Import, Export, and Regional
Consent in the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 19 EUR. J. INT'L L. 101, 101 (2008).
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important for two reasons. First, implementing the measure may require
technical knowledge and political buy-in. In these cases, it seems important to
involve political actors more familiar with the policy-making process. Second,
international courts are created through treaties between states, and thus, while
national courts stand in relation to only one state, international courts must be
mindful of states other than the defendant state.
Some argue that the European System should grant victims greater voice.
Note, for example, that under the pilot judgment procedure, the Court single-
handedly chooses one case to represent a class of cases. The other like cases
are then frozen until the pilot judgment is resolved. In other words, victims in
like cases are shut out, even though they clearly have a stake in the outcome.
The entire proceeding thus seems to emphasize the relationship of the court and
the states, and to de-emphasize the role of the victims. For both courts,
participation of civil society in the supervision stage is an ongoing challenge.
However, the European Court does allow civil society groups to present their
opinions on implementation to the Committee of Ministers.172
Structural reform is a fast-evolving area of both courts' work, and it is
perhaps too early to draw conclusive comparisons. So far, however, while both
systems are dialogic,173 the dialogue involves different stakeholders to different
extents. In the Inter-American System, the dialogue is judicially orchestrated. It
is a conversation over structural reform led by the judges, but which gives a
strong voice to the victims. In the European System, the dialogue is more
politically infused. The European Court of Human Rights engages in a
multilateral review in which member states not party to the case can
participate 74 It gives the victim less voice, emphasizing instead the interactions
between the Court, the Committee of Ministers in representation of the
contracting states, and the defendant state.
III. CONCLUSION
There has been an expansion of judicial power in the world over the past
four decades.1 75 An important piece of politics in our time takes the shape of
adjudication, with laws and policies being challenged before judges under
higher-ranking laws and principles. At the international level, there are now
over twenty-four permanent international courts adjudicating relations among
states and between states and their citizens. 176 This Article has revealed and
analyzed a new chapter in the ongoing judicialization of politics (and the
172. But see COUNCIL OF EUR., supra note 47, at 19 (noting "the increased participation of
civil society in the supervision process").
173. See generally Rosalind Dixon, Creating Dialogue About Socioeconomic Rights: Strong-
Form Versus Weak-Form Judicial Review Revisited, 5 INT'L J. CONST. L. 391 (2007) (presenting a
theory of constitutional dialogue in the context of a South African case). For criticisms of the concept of
dialogic review, see GARDBAUM, supra note 87; Gerards, supra note 151, at 111-2 1.
174. I thank David Sloss for suggesting the concept of multilateral review.
175. See Schor, supra note 87; see generally Tate & Vallinder, supra note 2 (examining the
recent trend of global judicialization of politics).
176. See generally ALTER, supra note 14.
[Vol. 40: 1
Reforming the State from Afar
accompanying politicization of law): structural reform litigation at the
international level.
The Article's contribution is three fold. First, it has demonstrated that,
however unlikely, the two main human rights courts have now involved
themselves in overseeing structural reform. They issue structural remedies and
then guide and supervise their implementation, a judicial practice first
described by Abram Chayes in the context of the United States. While scholars
in each region had noted the courts' evolution in this direction, this is the first
article to note the coincidence, and divergences, between the two courts'
structural practices.
Second, the Article offers an explanation for the structural turn: in the
face of third wave democracies and other transitional states that are unable or
unwilling to alter a practice that results in ongoing human rights violations,
compensatory remedies for each individual violation seem particularly
inadequate. Both courts chose to become more involved in reform at the state
level, with the idea that the extra pressure so provided would help weakly
institutionalized states overcome obstacles to compliance.
The Article thus enhances our understanding of the evolution of the
international judiciary and of the challenges faced by human rights courts in
particular. When ruling against weakly institutionalized states, human rights
courts have a choice. On the one hand, a court can simply declare that a
violation has taken place and order monetary compensation, likely leading to
judgment compliance. However, if the condemned state then continues to
repeat the same violation due to entrenched structural conditions, the court
appears ineffective despite judgment compliance. On the other hand, the court
can issue structural remedies. With this strategy, the court engages in resolving
the problem that is actually creating the violations, and is thus more relevant to
norm compliance (and to actually defending human rights). However, this
strategy risks a lower compliance rate. Potentially, the court's inability to
restructure entrenched institutional patterns-the limits of judicial power-will
be made evident. Any human rights court working in regions of state unwilling
or unable to reform state institutions will face this dilemma. Quasi-judicial
international organs such as the Inter-American Commission and the UN
Human Rights Committee working under the individual petition system face a
similar choice. This Article's description of the experience and strategies of the
Inter-American Court and the European Court will thus be useful to these other
courts and international bodies.
The Article's third contribution is to our understanding of the judicial
review practices of apex courts. It argues that the international courts have
responded to the challenges of structural reform by forging unique judicial
review strategies. The Inter-American Court emphasizes judicial discretion and
victim participation. By contrast, the European Court introduces into its review
a mechanism not available in the national setting: supervision of
implementation of remedies by the Court is coupled with ongoing supervision
by other states parties through the Committee of Ministers. The domestic
analog to this form of review would be that in a structural judgment against, for
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example, the California prison system, other states could weigh in on and
participate in the supervision of the implementation of the prison reform. This
form of multilateral review allows states parties to shape the meaning of
compliance and may well yield a more deferential standard. But it also allows
states with similar experiences to share their reform experiences with the
defendant state, and yield more pragmatic policies. The Article thus opens a
new chapter in the study of structural reform litigation and reveals strategies
and mechanisms not previously within its purview.
This Article is but a first step: its aim has been to highlight this new
practice of the world's two main human rights courts as a single phenomenon
and to offer explanations as to why and how they have made this turn. The next
step is to consider whether this new practice is effective and desirable. What
conditions predict compliance, and what impacts, besides compliance, does
international structural reform litigation have? These are important questions.
For now, we know only that the European Court has declared as successful at
least three of its twenty-nine pilot cases, and the Inter-American Court has
closed only one of its roughly fifty-five structural cases.1 77 It is still too early to
draw conclusions, comparative or otherwise, but the numbers are not
encouraging. The challenge is that these structural orders are issued most often
against states that have proven through their track records that they either lack
the will or ability to implement certain reforms, and it is still unclear whether
the international courts can alter the politics on the ground. The risk, as we
know from the practice of structural reform litigation in national settings, is
that courts get mired in drawn-out local processes that reach compromised and
uncertain outcomes. The risk, in other words, is that the courts' reputations will
be tainted by national dysfunction (in essence, exactly what they were trying to
avoid). Indeed, both human rights systems have recently faced political
challenges to their assertion of authority, and the pilot procedure in particular is
an ongoing source of debate in the European setting.'7 At the same time, as the
case studies show, the courts have managed to engage states and their
interlocutors in constructive processes even in cases where full compliance is
elusive. Empirical study of the courts' achievements on the ground, and of the
conditions that make them effective, is due.
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